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Abstr~ct 
Throughout the 1980's, there has been much activity in 
the abortion debate. At times, those involved in the debate 
have become passionate in persuing their goals. For the pro-
life movement, the aspiration is the banning of abortion. 
For the pro-choice, the intention is to protect abortion as 
it exists under Roe v. Wade and to expand access to abortion 
as much as possible. 
Each side has worked to extend their influence over 
national policy. Both sides have become aggressive in 
persuing their agendas and have used tactics that have at 
times been extreme in nature. The reaction of the general 
public has been mixed, depending on the tactic. These 
tactics have influenced the way in whicn the public reacts 
to the abortion debate. 
Some tactics of the pro-life movement, such as fire 
bombings and phoney abortion clinics-have had the effect of 
casting the entire movement in an extr~mist light. This is 
counter productive for the pro-life movement, since it seeks 
to appeal to the American public for support. 
l 
The pro-choice found itself on the sidelines for part 
of the debate, until it found itself under siege from 
Webster in 1988. After that, th~ pro-choice has taken a more 
active role in the abortion debate. 
After providing a history, this paper examines the 
various tactics and strategies that have been used by both 
) 
sides to achieve their goals. It will look at how each 
tactic was developed, and whether is was effective or not. 
In addition, the paper will also examine what tactics used 
by other groups were adopted by either the pro-life or the 
pro-choice movement and why. 
The tactics examined include: 
1. The pro-life use of fire bombings of abortion clinics. 
2. The pro-life development of phoney abortion clinics. 
3. The pro-life use of mass civi-1 disobedience. 
4. The lobbying by both sides of state and federal 
government. 
5. The influencing by both sides of public opinion. 
After looking at the tactics used, the paper then 
looks at the abortion debate overall to see what the 
failures or merits of the various tactics were. 
2 
CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION 
By definition, extremist stands don't find favor. 
On abortion, [the] two positions are seen by large 
majorities as extreme: that abortion should be 
established as an unlimited right, and that it 
should be categorically banned. 1 
As America enters the 199.0s, there is an issue that 
repeatedly dominates the political landscape. That is the 
debate surrounding abortion. For the past quarter century, 
abortion has steadily gained momentum as a question that can 
no longer be ignored by the political process. The actions 
of both sides have forced Americans to respond in $Orne 
manner to the question of abortion. 
Unlike other domestic issues such as the capital gains 
tax, ~bortion is a debate fueled more by emotion than 
logical and pragmatic thought. Abortion is a topic that is 
"heartfelt". In many cases a position on abortion exists as 
a fundamental tenet of an individual's personal belief 
sy~tem. It is not unreasonable for someone to compromise 
their position on property tax or deficit reduction given 
enough back room negotiation by the opposition. But abortion 
1 Opinion Roundup Public Opinion May/June 1989 p.8 
3 
apparently exists outside of this arena of negotiation and 
accommodation .. 
Abortion is a problem that defies any attempt at 
compromise. Part of this- is due to the fact that abortion is 
viewed as a constant by many Americans. Abortion in the 
abstract is either always wrong or always right. Over time, 
the debate over abortion has evolved into an entrenched and 
embittered battle, where nothing less than total victory may 
be accepted by either side. 
An interesting aspect is that the abortion conflict is 
actually two separate debates, each quite unrelated to the 
other. For the pro-life movement2 the position taken is 
that abortion is always wrong. For the pro-choice movement, 
the debate is not that of a moral question but rather a 
woman's right to privacy and control over her body. In this 
way, the question of morality is in conflict with· a woman's 
right to privacy. That the two sides are fighting over t~o 
2 The term pro-life movement will be used in a broad 
sense as will the term pro-choice movement. There is no 
single, unified "pro-life" or "pro-choice" movement. 
Instead, the terms serve as a convenient definition of the 
two major camps that exist in this country towards abortion. 
Within both of those camps, there is a wide spectrum of 
ideologies and thought. Often the only thing that they agree 
on is their respective position on abortion. An example of 
this in the pro-life movement who are opposed to abortion 
but support capital punishment. There are also groups within 
the pro-life movement who are opposed to both abortion and 
capital punishment. In this we can see the division that 
exists within both the pro-life and the pro-choice movement. 
4 
very .diff~rent questions may be an integral part of the 
complexity and entrenchment of the debate. If the two sides 
are fighting on two completely different :playing fields, 
there may exist no recognizable common ground. 
This paper serves to examine what tactics have been 
used by each side in trying to achieve their respective 
goals. The thesis seeks to address three primary questions: 
1) What are the tactics and strategies of the pro-life 
movement and pro-choice movements, and how effective 
have they been in achieving their goals. In order to 
do this, an assessment of their respective goals 
will be provided. 
2) If ·the respective groups have not achieved their 
main goal, are there second~ry goals that have been 
achieved. How far is each qroup from attaining these 
goals. 
3) What tactics have not been utilized in the debate 
and why have they not been used. Of the tactics that 
have been used, what is the rationale for choosing 
them. 
The structure of the abortion debate has in part 
determined both the various approaches that have been taken, 
and what future path it will follow. While this thesis is 
not in any way condoning the use of violence in the abortion 
debate, it will demonstrate how violence could be justified 
(or rationalized) by certain elements within the debate. In 
a sense, the actions taken in the abortion debate reflect 
5 
the level and intensity of emotion that underlies and 
influences the entire debate. 
To give but one illustration of the passion of the 
debate, even the choice of the names ~y both sides has had 
some impact on the public perception of the abortion debate 
and of those involved within the debate. Those who are 
opposed to abortion chose the name pro-life due in large 
part to the implication that the antonym (and their 
political opposition) was either pro-death or pro-abortion, 
both 6f which put that opposition into a most unsavory 
light. The name finally chosen by those who support abortion 
rights was the term pro-choice. 
The selection of this phrase reflects in large part the 
major difference in the orientation between the two sides 
(rights for the unborn verses freedom of choice). John Leo, 
a columnist for U.S. News & World Report writes that: 
A good deal of comment has appeared recently about 
the semantic tilt on the abortion issue. ("Pro-
Choice" for abortion on demand3 and "pro-.life" 
for anti-abortion are examples of ghastly 
3John Leo's own choice of words "abortion-on-demand" 
reflects his own personal views toward abortion. By using 
the term "abortion-on-demand" John Leo wishes to convey an 
impression of women demanding abortion at any stage of 
pregnancy. The use of such a literary device serves to 
distract discussion from the issue of freedom of choice by a 
woman and control over her own body. 
6 
argumentive jargon. The press generally uses the 
first as a neutral term but not the second.) 4 
Abortion has proven to be a topic that is so 
controversial that every aspect of it, even the names that 
are used, arouse contention. In every phase of the abortion 
debate, there is a great de-:.1 of "argumentative jargon". 
Both sides use terms such as abortion on demand, anti-
choice, baby killers and the like. These serve to be just 
one more definition of what is known as "the abortion 
debate." 
The tactics and strategies used by both sides have 
spanned a broad range of direct group and political action. 
Some of those activities chosen fall within the legal 
framework of society, while others exist outside of the 
bounds of legitimate action. These tactics are chosen by a 
variety of people for a myriad of reasons; some of them were 
driven by emotion, others were driven by pragmatic decisions 
and some by a mixture of both. These operative choices, 
regardless of their motivation, origin or wisdom, have 
shaped what the abortion debate has become in 1991. 
Many different strategies and tactics have been used, 
each with varying degrees of impact and success. Some of the 
4 Leo, John Is the press strait on abortion? 
U.S. News & World Report July 16, 1990 p. 17 
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more radical elements of the pro-life movement have used 
such tactics as fire bombings of abortion clinics, the 
creation of phoney abortion clinics and Operation Rescue. 
Th~ more mainstream elements of the pro-life movement have 
used such tactics as grassroots mobilization, participation~ 
in the political process and public relations. 
The pro-choice movement, which had played a passive 
role in the early years of th~ abortion debate (1973-1983), 
has relied in large part on its participation in the 
political process and intermittent protest marches. It will 
become clear early on in this paper that much of the 
analysis will center on the pro-life movement. Thi~ is due 
to the fact that the pro-life move~ent has been more active 
than the pro-choice movement. Much of this activity _has been 
in the area of gaining media attention and publicizing the 
position of the pro-life movement. 
Such action has been due to the fact that the pro-life 
movement was the outside group trying to change the system, 
and the pro-choice movement was the status quo5 • The 
starting point for this paper is the ruling in Roe v. Wade, 
5 The pro-choice movement was the status quo insofar as 
abortion was legal across the United States after 1973. Even 
though the pro-choice movement was on the side of the 
political majority, it did not enjoy appeal to all 
Americans. 
8 
which formed the framework for the abortion debate as we 
know it today. 
For the most part~ the position of the pro-choice 
movement represented the thinking of many during the 1980s. 
Although conservatism made great strides in American 
politics, the majority of American people still believed 
that abortion should remain legal. Abortion had become a 
right protected by the Constitution. The pro~choice movement 
could in part rest on the laurels of their success, since 
abortion· was legal due to their efforts. In contrast, the 
pro-life movement found themselves on the outside in a 
political sense, and sought to reverse the gains of the pro-
choice movement under the Supreme Court decision in Roe v. 
Wade. 
This separation from the mainstream of the American 
political system was to have a major impact on the initial 
tactics chosen by the pro-life movement. By being on the 
outside, the pro-life movement searched for a means to 
"breakthrough" to the mainstream. This desire to seek a 
place in the system may in part explain why many of the 
tactics chosen are to most observers fervent in nature. 
We must note that when one talks about the pro-life 
movement or pro-choice movements, there are not simply two 
9 
unified and organized groups. These groups do not exist as 
monolithic organizations set on each side of explicitly 
defined battlefields, with established unitary leadership 
and a Clear cut plan of action. Rath~r, the terms pro-life 
movement and pro-choice movement are used as a broad banner 
under which many different groups, based on a common 
element, formulate a position on abortion. 
This. concept is most important when thinking in terms 
of the leadership for each movement. While these sub-groups 
may share the same position on abortion (either for or 
against), this may be the only thiry1' that they have in 
common. This factor of competing interests within the 
mov~ment may belp to explain why their goals may not always 
be achieved. With many competing interests and positions, an 
emerging leader for one faction may not appeal to the other 
factions within the movement. As with ·political parties, 
this makes the selection of an accepted leader hard, if not 
impossible. 
To be clear, there are many prominent members of both 
movements that have a made a large impact on the direction 
of strategies on each side. However there is not just one 
leader of each movement, but many. Each of these leaders has 
competing interests within each faction which can at times 
impede the progress of the overall movement. 
10 
CHAPTER TWO-HISTORY OF ABORTION 
History is past politics and politics presen
t history 
Sir John Seeley6 
·Before examining the various tactics of both
 sides, it 
is important to have some understanding of th
e history of 
abortion. The present controversy over abort
ion is an event 
of recent invention. Aside from a period in 
the mid 19th 
century, abortion was almost a non-issue on 
the American 
·political scene. Its position in American s
ociety became 
fixed, and there were few challenges to the 
status of 
abortion. Even in 18~0, when abortion became
 a national 
issue, the emotion and division surrounding 
abortion did not 
match the intensity level of today's debate.
 
Abortion as a medical procedure has existed 
since 
ancient times. One of the earliest reference
s is found in 
the writings of Shen Nung, Emperor of China 
(2737-2696 
B.C.) 7 • Both Aristotle and Plato discussed abortion and
 the 
circumstances under which the state should a
llow it. Each 
felt that the needs of the state superseded 
the rights of 
6 Oxford University Press The Oxford Dictionar
y of 
Quotations New York: Oxford University Press, 1980 p. 
416 
7 Hodgson, Jane E. Abortion and Sterilization 
New York: 
Academic Press, 1981, p. 2 
11 
individual citizens. In his book The Republic Plato state
s 
that: 
The woman, I said, beginning at the age of twenty, 
shall bear for the state to the age of forty and 
the man shall beget for the state from the time he 
passes his prime in the swiftness of running until 
the age of fifty-five. That is, he said, the 
maturity and prime for both the body and mind. 
Then, if anyone older or younger than the 
prescribed age meddles with the procreation ·for 
the state,,,[we] first admonish them not even to 
bring to light anything whatever thus conceiV~d
8 
Aristotle writes in his book, Politics that: 
(I]f established custom is opposed (as it is in 
our state) to an unrestricted birthrate, no child 
must ever be exposed with a view to limiting the 
population. If a couple beget too many children, 
abortion must be procured before the embryo has 
reached the state of sensitive life ... 
9 
In the Roman. Empire, abortion occupied a different 
place in society. Although abortion was widespread, it d
id 
not enjoy broad acceptance. Due to the size and scope .of the 
Roman Empire, abortion still existed, although under an 
official condemnation. As the Roman Empire embraced 
Christianity, this condemnation of abortion was carried o
ver 
and remained through the beginnings of modern Europe. It 
was 
in this capacity that abortion was to exist for the next 
8 Plato The Republic Translated by Paul Shorey London: 
William Heinemann, Ltd, 1969 p. 464-465 
9 Aristotle Politics Translated by John Warrington 
London: J.·M. Dent & Son, Ltd., 1959 p. 217-218 
12 
1000 years. Over time, the position towards abortion 
softened, and by the 17th century, abortion had gained a 
minimal acceptance in society. Under English Common Law, 
abortion was tolerated, and at times even given some legal 
standing. It was this position towards abortion that was 
brought to the English Colonies in the 17th century, and 
became accepted as part of American law. 
The acceptance of abortion, or at least a tacit 
tolerance, was based on the theory of quickening. Quickening 
is the belief that a fetus does not solidify until about the 
fifth month when it is first felt by the mother. Prior to 
this point, it was not a fetus, and. thus abortion before 
quickening does not present a moral dilemma. 
By 1780, abortion was not widespread in America, and 
was seen mainly as a means to conceal the results of an 
illicit or extramarital affair. Over the next twenty years 
however, both abortion and the United States were to undergo 
a radical change. During that period (1780-1800), the 
American birthrate rapidly increased. This expanded 
birthrate was to have an impact on the development of the 
young country, as it expanded westward. 
By 1801, however, this birthrate started to decline 
markedly. Although there were many contributing factors, 
13 
abortion was seen to have a major impact. For the firs
t 
time, American women were taking steps to
 control the size 
and spacing of their families. By 1820, so
me states began 
to move to place restrictions on abortion. 
However, the legal 
penalty was not severe in most cases. At w
orst, a women faced 
a misdemeanor charge for having an abortio
n. 
Part of the problem was that a convic
tion, if even 
sought, was hard to obtain. A major obstacle was th
at the 
women being charged with the crime was the
 only one who could 
prove or disprove if quickening had occurr
ed. In addition, it 
was Seen at the time as rather unpleasant 
to force a woman to 
testify in court against herself. 
In 1821, Connecticut. became the first state
 to pass a law 
that made abortion illegal after quickenin
g occurred. The law 
stated in part that: 
Every person who shall, willfully and mal
iciously, 
administer to, or cause to be administere
d to, or 
taken by, any person or persons, deadly po
ison, or 
other noxious and destructive substance, 
with an 
intention him, her or them, thereby to mu
rder, or 
thereby cause or procure the miscarriage
 of any 
woman, being quick with child, and shall be
 thereof 
duly convicted, shall suffer imprisonm
ent, in 
Newgate prison, during his natural life,
 or for 
such other term as the court having ·cogn
izance of 
the offence shall determine.
10 
10 Gorman, j Abortion and the Early Church Mahwah,- N
J: 
Paulist Printers, 1983, P~ 26 
14 
We must note that the Con
necticut law made the 
determination based on a woman w
ho was quick with a child. The 
law also made a determination m
ore about the use of poisons 
than sur~ical abortions. 
New York passed a law in 1828 tha
t prohibited abortion at 
any stage uriless there was a· dir
ect threat to the life of the 
mother. The New York law was
 the first one that made no 
determination based on quick
ening. The sole basis for 
conviction was that an abortion 
had occurred. The law was also 
more encompassing in it's restr
ictions, as shown below . 
. Every person who shall willfull
y administer to .any 
pregnant woman, any medicine, 
drug, substance or 
thing whatever, or shall u
se or employ any 
instrument or other means wh
atever, with intent 
thereby to procure the miscar
riage of any such 
woman, unless the same shall ha
ve been n~cessary to 
preserve the life of the woman,
 or shall have been 
advised by two physicians to be
 necessary for that 
purpose;sha.11, upon convictio
n, be punished by 
imprisonment in a county jail no more 
that one 
year, or by a fine not exce
eding five hundred 
dollars, or by both such fine a
nd imprisonme.nt. 
11 
That New York passed a testricti
ve abortion law did not 
s~em· to entice other states to 
follow suit. By 1840, only 10 
of the 26 states had any laws
 that controlled abortion. 
12 
Only five of these states banne
d abortion at any stage. 
11 IBID p. 27 
12 Domblaser, Carole and Lardy, Ut
a The Abortion Guide 
A Handbook for Women and Men Ne
w York: Playboy Paperbacks, 
1982, p. 13 
15 
We must note that these various laws were not enacted 
solely from a strict moral code that condemned the practice 
of abortion. Rather the position taken was one that abortion, 
; in some degree, was affecting the growth and development of 
the United States. Another aspect of the Connecticut 
legislation was that the surgery at the time was crude in 
nature and posed a genuine threat to. the welfare of the 
mother. Thus, along with the concern of maintaining 
birthrates, these laws had the goal of protecting women from 
a risky medical procedure. 
Until the start of the Cjvil War, abortion existed and 
endured under these conditions. Although many states enacted 
laws, few of them carried any real .legal enforcement. By 1840, 
abortion had come into public view due to the changing social 
make up of the nation. America, and its c.itizens, were 
ch.anging in composition. No longer were Americans solely 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants from New Erigland, but immigration was 
bringing in people from Ireland and Southern Europe, causing 
a change in the social and ethnic fabric of the nation. The 
rise of the modern urban cities also served to bring about 
social change. 
At this time abortion was advertised openly in many 
newspapers. In cities like New York and Boston, the classified 
sections of newspapers carried such advertisements. The 
16 
example below illustrates the general tone and style of the 
advertisements. 
Female Monthly Pills: Owing to the celebrity, 
efficiencr and invariable success of Madame 
Restell' s 3 Female Pills in removing female 
irregularity since th~ir introduction into the 
United States, now about 7 years, counterfeits and 
imitations are constantly attempted to be palmed 
off for the genuine. Cheap, common pills are 
purchased, put up in different boxes and called 
"Fema1e Monthly Pills," with the object of 
deceiving the simple and unwary. Since the well 
known success of Madame Restell in the treatment of 
complaints arising from female irregularity, 
numerous imitators, without knowledge, skill or 
experience, now and then appear, all making 
pretensions to cure complaints, of the nature of 
which they are wholly ignorant. It behooves, 
therefore, to be careful to whom they entrust 
themselves with indisposition in the treatment 
which Madame Restell's experience and specifics has 
been pre-eminently successful. CAUTION-NO "Female 
Monthly Pills" are genuine except those sold at 
Madame Restell 's Principal off ice, 148 Greenwich 
st. and by appointment, 129 Liberty st., New York. 
Price $1. They can used by married or single, by 
following directions. Madame Restell's signature is 
written on the cover of each box. Boston office 7 
Essex st. 14 
The term abortion 
. 
lS not ·used anywhere in the 
advertisement, but rather an inference was drawn upon, using 
such terms as "uterine disorders" and "female irregularities". 
13 Madame Restell was a New York woman named Ann Lohman 
who helped to commercialize abortion in the 1840s. She was 
in business for 35 years, and she had branch offices up and 
down the East Coast. 
14 Mohr, James c. Abortion in America 1800-1900 ·New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 51 
17 
It was assumed by all concerned that there was an 
understanding as to the meaning of the terms. By keeping it in 
the back ·pages and not mentioning it in polite company, 
abortion endured with minimal interference from state 
authorities and society at large. 
As medical knowledge increased, some started to question 
the practic·e of abortion. During this period, 1840-1860, 
abortion seemed to many to be endemic in the scope of its 
practice. It is estimated that by 1850-1860, one abortion 
occurred for every five live births. 15 It was not just the 
percentages of abortions that concerned people, but a 
concurrent drop in the over al 1 birth ·rate. In 1800, the 
average American woman bore 7.04 children. By the end of the 
19th Century, the average American woman bore 3.56 
children. 16 Modern demographers have established that this 
decline began as early as 1810. 17 In this sense, it was 
believed that there ~as a direct relationship between abortion 
and the birthrate. 
15 Domblaser, Carole and Lardy, Uta The Abortion Guide 
a Handbook for Women and Men. New York: Playboy Paperbacks, 
1982, p. 13 
16 Luker, Kristin Abortion and the Politics of 
Motherhood Berkeley, California: Urtiversity of California 
Press, 1984, p. 23 
17 Petchesky, Rosalind Pollack Abortion and Woman's 
Choice Boston: North Eastern University Pres~, 1990 p. 73 
18 
·, 
Although the drop in the birthrate is due to many 
factors, abortion played a direct role. Other factors include 
a gradual lowering of infant mortality rates. At the start of 
the 19th Century, more children would die in the first few 
years of life than would . in 1899. Advances in medical 
knowledge account for part of this drop in infant mortality. 
How~ver, advances ih child health care can not fully explain 
a 50 percent drop in the birth rate. 
By 1900, abortion had been outlawed in every state. In 
the short span of 40 years, social forces had been able to 
change the laws in the entire nation. A driving force behind 
the banning of abortion was the medical movement after 1850. 
While the advances in medical knowledge were important, the 
changes in the framework of the medical professional would 
prove to have a lasting impact. Throughout the 19th Century, 
the medical profession transformed itself from a collection of 
self taught doctors and midwives to a highly controlled 
profession of physicians. 
By the mid 1800s doctors had banded together under the 
aegis of the American Medical Association (AMA) and started to 
act against the practice of abortion. Founded in Chicago in 
184 7 in an effort to gain acceptance for the professional 
doctor, the AMA and other groups sought to eliminate abortion 
providers, who performed most of the abortions at that time. 
19 
So complete was the domination of the AMA that to this day 
they monopolize most aspects of the American health care 
system. 
,( 
From its founding in Chicago, the AMA began lobbying 
against abortions by anyone but a licensed physician. 18 As 
the social morays of the time started to change, abortion fell 
out of favor. In 1849, the AMA went a step further and_passed 
a resolution that condemn~d abortion and urged state 
legislators to make it illegal. 19 
From the Louisville convention of 1859 through the 
rest of the nineteenth century, the steadily 
growing AMA would remain steadfastly and officially 
committed to outlawing the practice of abortion in 
the United States, both inside and outside the 
organization, and the vigorous efforts of America's 
regular physicians would prove to be in the long 
run to be the single most important factor in 
altering the legal policies towards abortion in 
this country. 20 
Doctors, then an a.lmost exclusively white .male 
prof~ssion, started to impart their moral 21 and professiona·l 
18 Sagen, Carl and Druyan, Ann "The Question of 
Abortion" Parade April 22, 1990, p. 8 
19 Turkel, Susan Neiberg Abortion New York: Franklin 
Watts, 1988, p. 18 
20 Mohr, John Abortion in America 1800-1900 New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 57 
21 The moral judgement being that abortion is wrong and 
that it's spread must be stopped. 
20 
judgement upon the issue of abortion. The doctors of the time 
approached the issue with a f e·eling that if told the "moral" 
facts about abortion, women would be persuaded not have 
abortions. 
A large part of this social awareness towards abortion 
was that the clients who were seeking abortions had changed. 
For the first time, white, middle-classed and married 
Protestant women were seeking abortions. 
Pollack Petechesky: 
Writes Rosalind 
. ' 
[ I J n practice Victorian middle class women were 
apparently relying on abortion with growing 
frequency in order to assert control over the 
spacing and number of their children and thus over 
the situation within "their sphere." 
The shifting class _base of abortion, even more 
than its overall rise, undoubtedly accounts for the 
severity of the political attack against it. 22 
As abortion began to enter the mainstrea~ .of American 
middle class life, it brought about the wrath of the white, 
male establishment. Abortion had become a challenge to the 
traditional male dominance as head of the household. Women 
were nbw able to control the size of their family. 
While .the option of abortion was vigorously discouraged 
among the white middle class, it was not among the new 
22 Petchesky, Rosalind Pollack Abortion and Woman's 
Choice Boston: North Eastern University Press, 1990, p. 79 
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immigrants. There now exist~q_ this class definition that 
abortion was wrong only when it applied to native women. 
Abortion was more acceptable if it kept down ·the population of 
the new immigrant populations. 
Just as the Yankee woman was duty-bound to 
"propagate the race" and def end "the home", the 
immigrant, the poor, or black, regarded as carriers 
of disease and a breeder of "bad stock" was 
admonished to a~oid reproducing. Thus misogyny and 
sexual control clearly interact with population 
control; pronatalism geared towards the tipper class 
and antinatalism geared towards the lower classes 
presuppose that for women to control fertility is a 
dangerous and subversive thing23 
The successful campaign to outlaw abortion started to 
gain momentum in the 1870s. The attack on abortion was three 
pronged in nature. The reformers sought to dissuade doctors 
from performing abortions; to attempt to force newspapers to 
stop advertisements and to try and build a new perception 
about abortion by the public. 
One of the popular methods chosen was to give lectures 
about the evils of abortion. In a speech given to the 
Philadelphia county Medical Society on February 9, 1870, the 
President of the Society, Andrew Nebinger, M.D., talked of 
abortion. His lecture, Cr imina 1 Abortion: It's Extent and 
Prevention, deals with the widespread availability 6f abortion 
and it's effects on society. 
23 IBID p. 79 
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Dr. Nebinger, along with many in his profession, sought 
to limit abortion as much as possible. These medical 
professionals felt that the reason why abortion was so wide 
spread was that women were simply "uninformed" about abortion. 
If only shown the errors of their ways, women wotild not choose 
abortion. Dr. Nebinger states: 
These facts demand that I shall here renew the 
plea for women of ignorance. She sins, yet knows 
not the magnitude of her offenses. She violates the 
command of God, not in the fullness of her 
intelligence, but in the completeness of her 
ignorance.She tears open her womb, or permits it to 
be assailed with instruments or emmenagouges, and 
the little being within its portal to be ruthlessly 
destroyed, mainly because she does not comprehend 
the immoral enormity of her conduct. I have 
persona·1 evidence which teaches me that, if women 
fully comprehended the extent of the er ime, she 
would not for a few worldly, ephemeral pleasures, 
or for an exemption from a few toils here on earth, 
risk an eternity of bliss. 24 
By 1900, every state had passed laws outlawing abortion. 
For the next 60 years, these abortion laws were to remain in 
place essentially unchallenged. The 19th Century had started 
with relative free access to abortion, and· had ended with 
complete abolishment of abortion. 
During the first sixty years of the 20th century, 
abortion existed under the same conditions. Legal abortion in 
24 Nebinger, Andrew M.D. Criminal Abortion: It's Extent 
and Prevention Philadelphia: Collins Printer, 1870, p. 1 
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the United States was not ~ide sprea~. It ~as not discussed, 
nor was it much of a political issue. Illegal abortions did 
exist of course, as they always had. In the 1960s however, two 
events occurred that brought abortion back into the spotlight. 
Two unrelated events of the early 1960s brought abortion 
onto the political stage. First, betwe~n 1961-6j, there was 
major concern over a ne~ly developed drug, thalidomide. The 
drug had been widely used in Europe as a sedative in sl~eping 
pills. It was later discovered that the use of thalidomide 
could cause fetal abnormalities 
. 
in some cases. When an 
American woman, Sherri Finkbine, found out she was pregnant 
and had inadvertently taken thalidomide, she tried to have an 
abortion. 
When Mrs. Finkbine found that she was unable to obtain an 
abortion in her home state of Arizona, the controversy came to 
national attention. 25 Mrs. Fihkbine eventually had an 
abortion in Sweden26 , but her case brought to light the need 
·
25 Mrs. Finkbine was unable to obtain an abortion in 
the state of Arizona, since a fear of a deformed child 
was not one the conditions under which Arizona law allowed 
abortions. Arizona only allowed abortions if there was a 
blear threat to the life of the mother~ 
26 Mrs. Finkbine had to spend a week iri Sweden until 
she was finally allowed to have an abortion. The Swedish 
authorities spent that time deciding whether Mrs. Finkbine, 
as a U.S. citizen, should be allowed to have an abortion 
under Swedish Law. 
24 
for some level of reform of the abortion laws in Arizona and 
the United States. 
The second event was a nationwide outbreak of Rubella 
(German) Measles . in 1964. Again, the fear of fetal 
abnormalities was raised. In the space of two years Americans 
saw that the existing abortion laws did not have provisions 
for cases such as these. As with the thalidomide scare, it was 
clear that the abortion. laws needed to be reformed to 
accommodate such public health concerns. 
These two related events served to focus the attention of 
the American public on abortion. The existing abortion laws 
had been written prior to 1900, and societal and medical 
advancements warranted their revision. The changes in American 
society of the time also provided an impetus for revision of 
existing abortion laws. 
In 1967, Colorado, California and North Carolina became 
the first states to liberalize abortion laws. By 1970, 16 
states had new abortion laws, and most states had considered 
new bills. 27 These changes in laws at the state level 
reflected a new view towards abortion. The issues had moved 
from a strictly moral based argument to one that dealt with 
27 Sarvis, Betty and Rodman, Hyman The Abortion 
Controversy New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, p. 
11 
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the. medical aspects. Many of the original ~bortion laws had 
been written over concerns of dangerous medical prbcedure. In 
the intervening 150 years, medical practices had made abortion 
a safe artd routine. med·ical procedu~e; 
26 
Chapter Three Roe v. Wade 
An event has happened, upon which i
t is 
difficult to speak and i~possible t
o be silent 
Edmund Burke28 
In 1~73, everything changed in the
 abortion debate. On 
January 23, the Supreme Court h
anded down two landmark 
decisions, Roe v Wade (410 US 113) and Doe 
v. Bolton (410 US 
174). These two cases were taken together
, and served as a 
milestone in the abortion debate. Fo
r the pro-choice movement, 
Roe v. Wade was a clear cut and de
finitive victory. For the 
pro-life it was an equally apparent
 defeat. Abortion had been 
given protectioh under the law as a
 matter of privacy. 
The basic tenets of the Roe v·. Wade 
decision was that the 
Constitution protected a citizen's
 right to privacy. These 
rights were broad enough so they co
uld be applied, as in this 
case, to the circumstance of abo
rtion. Justice B.lackmum, 
writing for the majority29 , stated~ 
The Constitution does not e.xplici
tly mention any 
right to privacy. In a line of decis
ions, the Court 
28 Oxford University Press The Oxford 
Dictionary of 
Quotations New York: Oxford University Pres
s, 1980 p. 110 
29 The decision in Roe v. Wade was a 7
-2 majority. 
Those Justices in the majority were lustices
 Blackmum, 
Douglas, Stewart, Burger, Marshall,
 Brennen, Powell. The two 
dissenting votes were Justices Whi
te and Rehnquist. Justice 
Rehnquist now sits as the Chief Ju
stice of the Supreme 
Court. 
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has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or 
a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, 
does exist under the Constitution ... This right of 
privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment's concept of personal liberty and 
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, 
or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth 
Amendment's reservation of rights of the people, is 
broad enough to encompass a woman's decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy
30 
The decision also discussed the balance that 
must be 
maintained between the rights of the woman and the "p
otential 
life" of the fetus. Writing in concurrence with
 Justice 
Blackmum, Justice Douglas writes: 
[A] women is free to make the basic decision 
whether to bear an unwanted child. Elaborate 
argument is hardly necessary to demonstrate that 
childbirth may deprive a woman of her preferred 
lifestyle and force upon her a radically different 
and undesired future. 31 
The minority 
. . 
op1n1ons in this case held that the 
interpretation of the majority is faulted in it's logical 
assumption. The dissenting opinions of Just
ice ·white and 
Justice Rehnquist felt that the majority was creating ri~hts 
in the Constitution that were not there. It was also f
elt that 
30 United States Supreme Courts 410 US 113 Washington, 
D.c~: United States Supreme Court Report, 1972 35 L E
d 2d p. 
193-194 
31 IBID p. 2 9 
28 
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the issue of privacy was not an issue in the case, as was put 
.forth by the majority opinion. 
This brief history of abortion is important insofar as it 
helps to explain how abortion has become the national issue 
that it is today. In terms of American history, abortion's 
dominance as an issue has been cyclic in nature. For the first 
part of the 19th century, abortion was not a major concern to 
most people. By the 1850s, abortion had evolved into an issue 
of major importance. Concern over abortion at that time was 
enough to launch a crusade against it. 
The next section of this paper will examine ·the tactics 
and strategies that have been employed by both sides in the 
abortion debate. The time frame that will be dealt with is 
that from Roe v. Wade in 1973 to the present day. A larg~ part 
of the examination will deal with attempts to reverse Roe v. 
Wade, as the pro~life movement pushes to roll back abortion to 
it's pre-legal days. 
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Chapter Four-The Pro-Life and the Pro-Choice Movement 
We can believe what we choose, we are answerable for what 
we choose to believe 
Cardinal Newman32 
Since the practical goal of the pro-iife movement is to 
reverse Roe v. Wade, it must take active steps to achieve that 
end. In contrast, the pro-choice movement has already achieved 
its primary goal of legal abortions. The pro-choice movement 
finds itself in the position of defending Roe v. Wade from 
attack. Based perhaps in its apparent minority status, the 
pro-life movement has sought to get as much media coverage as 
possible. The struggle for the pro-life movement at this point 
is simply to bring the issue to the American people. The pro-
choice movement did not engage in any real action until it saw 
th~t its position was directly threatened. For almost ·10 years 
after Roe v. Wade, the pro-choice movement took an almost 
passive role and attitudes towards the pro-life movement. 
The actions of the pro-choice movemen:t at this time 
(1973-1980) were mainly those of maintaining a public 
relations campaign and answering the pro-life movement at each 
turn. The pro-choice movement did not take an attacking role 
in how it approached the abortion debate. Part of this can be 
32 Oxford University Press The Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations New York: Oxford University Press, 1980 p.361 
30 
explained by the fact that before 1980 the pro-life movement 
was not seen as the threat that it was to become in the mid-
1980s. By any measure, the rights achieved under Roe v. Wade 
were a clear political and legal victory for the pro-choice 
movement. With this success, the pro-choice movement became 
less vigilant in protecting legalized abortion. 
It is easy to see why the pro-choice movement ignored the 
threat of the pro~life movement,. especially from such groups 
as the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), which 
had fought a hard battle for legalized abortion. NARAL was 
formed in 1969 to promote the liberalization of the nation's 
abortion la~s. Considering the precedent set by Roe v. Wade, 
NARAL could claim for its elf great success in gaining abortion 
rights for all American women. 
This demand for changes in existing abortion laws was 
driven by a collection of doctors, public health advocates and 
feminists who felt that a change was needed in the existing 
system. Writes Lawrence Tribe: 
Feminists did not base their support for abortion 
repeal on any specific findings of abortion reform 
laws were working. Access to abortion was a 
corollary of the underlying philosophy of the 
movement. Criminal abortion laws were anathema to 
those who believe that women, no less than men, 
31 
should be able to control their bodies and the
ir 
lives. 33 
Given this, most of this section will deal w
ith the 
actions taken by the pro-life movement. It is 
worth noting 
that as time goes on and the pro-life movement l
obby becomes 
more organized, its methods of operation develope
d into a more 
professional approach to lobbying. ·one explanat
ion for this 
increased professionalism could be the fact that
 as the pro~ 
life move~ent progressed into the 1980s, it gained
 a political 
savvy. With the election of Ronald Reagan, t
he pro-life 
movement, and the New Right found themselves
 within the 
political arena fdr the first time in many years. 
A large part 
of this was the new found power that the politica
l leaders of 
the i980s had discovered. These powers, eith
er real or 
perceived, gave rise to substantive ~hanges 
in the way 
government was run. 
An important aspect o.f both the pro-life movem
ent and 
pro-choice movement is the uniqueness of both g
roups. While 
most single issue groups are based on some econom
ic concerns, 
these two groups are driven by different moti
vations. The 
incentive for each group is not money, but abstra
ct concepts; 
excerising personal freedom or a measuremen
t of moral 
correctness, depending on the side. Such a clea
r ~otivation 
33 Tribe, Lawrence H. Abortion The Clash of Absolut
es 
New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990, p. 140 
32 
beyond personal gains requires a great dedication to the cause 
and a willingness to fight for many years. 
Such devotion is clear in the actions of members of both 
the pro-life movement and pro-choice movements. Such a 
devotion also provides the basis for the nev~r surrender 
attitude of both sides. The successful resolution of the 
abortion debate in an acceptable compromise seems remote. It 
is clear from the debate at the state and local levels that 
abortion will be an issue that will face Americans for most of 
the 1990s. 
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Chapter Five The Early Years 
Though the locusts have no kings, they 
go forth, all of them by bands 
Proverbs 3 o: 27 34 
The pro-life movement had its founding in the waning days 
of the 1960s. With the social upheaval of the time, some 
people felt that it was time that abortion be challenged on 
moral and religious grounds. In many ways, the pro-life 
movement existed as a "counter revolution" of the time. The 
values of the pro-life movement were based in part on the same 
beliefs as law and order candidates of the day. 
By 1970, the Catholic Church in America had started to 
organize groups to counter the movement towards easing of 
abortion laws at the state level. When Roe v. Wade was handed 
down . in 1973, the Catholic Church started a full-scale 
campaign to get a human rights amendment passed. All the pro-
life groups now had a common enemy, and thus were .able to 
better focus their r~sources. These various groups spent most 
of the 1970s joining their power together and refining their 
methods of attack. The judgement in ·Roe v. Wade provided the 
pro-life movement with the enemy to rally against. 
34 The King James Version of Holy Bible 
34 
~ 
The pro-life movement, in a formal sense, was a creation 
of the Family Life division of the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops (NCCB). In 1975, the NCCB presented a 
detailed plan for combatting Roe .v. Wade, saying that it 
"would not accept the Court's judgement". 35 The plan was 
divided into four parts, and was the overall strategy for the 
Church's antiabortion crusade. The basic outline was: 
Establishment of a network of "pro-life 
committees," based in: the parishes that would 
(1) effect the passage of a "pro-l_ife" amendment, 
(2) elect "pro-life" sympathizers to local party 
organizations, 
(3) monitor officials on their abortion stands, and 
(4) work for qualified candidates who will vote for 
a constitutional amendment and other pro-life 
issues. 36 
For the most part, however, the various pro-life groups 
existed independent of one another. At this time there existed 
no central, unified coordination among these groups on how 
they could combat abortion .. Through the end of the 1960s, 
these groups operated within their communities to try to 
change the abortion laws at the state and local levels. 
Of all the pro-life groups that were formed after Roe v. 
Wade, the largest was the National Right to Life Committee 
35 Petchesky, Rosalind Pollack Abortion and Woman's 
Choice Boston: North Eastern University Press, 1990, p. 
252 
36 IBID p . 2 5 3 
35 
(NRLC). To this day, the NRLC is the acknowledged leader of 
pro-life forces. According to a NRLC fact sheet, the NRLC was 
formed as a non-sectarian, non-profit org~nization to 
coordinate national right to life efforts.
37 Although t~ey 
would like to label themselves as non-sectarian, it 
. 
lS 
apparent that they are, in fact, religious and anti-
secular. 3a 
The father of the NRLC, artd it's current president, is 
Dr. John c. Willke. Dr. Willke was~ pro-life activist prior 
to Roe v. Wade. Dr Willke wrote many books in the early 1970s 
to press for the national abolition of abortion. Some of these 
books, such as Handbook on Abortion and Four Ways to Kill a 
Baby had a major impact on the early abortion debate. 
Dr. Willke was instrumental in defeating a 1972 Michigan 
referendum that would have legalized abortion in the first 
twenty weeks. Dr. Willke waged a mass media campaign and 
handed out graphic brochures that depicted aborted fetuses. 
Even though the referendum had 59 percent support before the 
vote, it was defeated 62 percent to 38 percent.
39 It 
37 National Right to Life "Information Sheet" 
Washington, DC: Nationai Right to Life~ 1989, p. 1 
. 
lS 
38 Petchesky, Rosalind Pollack Abortion and Woman's 
Choice Boston: North Eastern University Press, 1990, p. 252 
39 Tribe, Lawrence H. Abortion The Clash of Absolutes 
New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990, p. 50 
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through the NRLC that much of the formal pro-life actions
 are 
organized. 
It was the formation of the NRLC that provided the real 
organ~zation for the pro-life movement as a political fo
rce. 
Through the NRLC, the pro-life movement gained tang
ible 
influence over the nation's politicians. Working with a s
mall 
nucleus of legislative technicians
40 and political 
strategists, the NRLC launched a nationwide campaign at 
the 
state level to reverse the gains made under Roe v. Wade. 
Until the close of the 1970s, the pro-life movement 
existed on the political sidelines in terms of natio
nal 
attitudes. Roe had been accepted, and states began
 to 
liberalize abortion laws. All that changed in 1980·, with 
the 
election of Ronald Reagan. The 1980 election marked the r
ise 
of the political phenomenon known as the New Right. The
 New 
Right was a political movement that sought to reimpose wh
at it 
labe1ed "old fashioned values" in order to restore Ameri
ca's 
greatness. Some of the more prominent members of the New R
ight 
movement were Jesse Helms, Pat Robertson, Jerry Fawell, 
and 
Ronald Reagan. 
40 Petchesky, Rosalind Pollack Abortion and Women's 
Choice Boston: North Eastern University Press, 1990, p. 
254 
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The New Right advocat~d such things as school 
prayer, 
government deregulation, a strong national de
fense and a 
repeal ~f Roe v. Wade. A major theme 9f the New Right was that 
they were "pro-family". The prevailing· feeling 
among the New 
Right was that America needed to return to the f
amily values 
that were prevalent, or perceived to be prevale
nt, prior to 
the 19·60s. 
Through a combination of the conservative Republic
ans and 
Fundamentalist Christians, the Ne~ Right establish
ed an agenda 
for America. The New Right brought Fundamentalis
t Christians 
back into the political arena. These Christians ha
d found that 
the Democratic Congress of the 1960s and 197
0s had not 
effectively represented their views. Through the
 New Right, 
they had found a political voice. The .changes of t
he era, such 
as abortion rights, militant demands for minorit
y rights and 
an attempt to bring equality to women were seen
 as negative 
and undesirable. Returning to a "pro-family" sta
nce was the 
driving force behind the New Right ~ovement. 
The New Right sought to create a national p
olitical 
machine by which to control all phases of th
e political 
process. This machine would transcend political 
pa~ties, win 
elect.ions and control state legislatures t
hrough the 
initiation of legislation and policy. Pa
rt of the 
effectiveness of this method, especially in 198
0, was from 
38 
targeting every conservative single issue based group in the __j 
country. Antiabortion groups, ~un groups, anti-busing, school 
prayer, and anti-ERA groups were all banded under a broad 
based coalition. 
It is at this point, the election of 1980, that much of 
the activity on both sides starts to take place. Before this, 
the pro-life movement had spent most of it's time in trying to 
persuade state legislators to place restrictions on abortion. 
From this point on, we will examine the different actions 
taken, and judge their relative su~cess. 
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Chapter Six-The Fire Bombings 
Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice; 
moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue. 
Senator Barry Goldwater 
By ·the early 1980s certain factions within the pro-life 
mcivement had become frustrated at the ineffectiveness of
 the 
NRLC. After 10 years of what they perceived as inaction in
 the 
abortion battle, they chose to change the method of atta
ck. 
The previous strategy of lobbying at the state level to p
lace 
limitations dn abortion was slow. Gains were being measure
d in 
terms of years, not months. It was felt by more mili
tant 
elements of the pro-life movement that limiting abortion w
ould 
not be enough. What was required was a ·drastic method
 of 
stopping abortion. 
Joseph M. Scheidler, director of the Pro-Life Action 
League, states: "You can try for fifty years to do it the 
nice 
polite way, or you can do it next week the nasty way .. 
1141 It 
was Mr. Scheidler and those like him who felt that the 
pro-
life movement should use direct action in order to achieve 
its 
goal. These militant elements felt that in the cas
e of 
41 Wohl, Lisa Cronin "Pro-Life Extremist Tactics Should 
be Condemned" Quarrels that have shaped the Constitution 
New York: Harper & Row, 1987, p. 179 
40 
abortion, the ends (outlawing abortion) would justify the 
means (fire bombings) that were used. 42 
One of the first actions taken was that of violent 
attacks against abortion clinics. These acts included 
bombings, arson, trespassing and vandalism of clinics. The 
dominant method was to bomb a clinic late at night or early in 
the morning so as not to injure anyone. 
Through the early 1980s the number of incidents of 
reported violence increased. From 1977-1981, there were 9 
cases of arson and four cases of bombings. In 1982 alone there 
were four incidents of arson and four of bombings. By 1984, 
the number had jumped to . SlX arson, and eighteen, 
respecti vly. 43 The violenc'e was so extreme that in March of 
1985 the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights 
convened hearings on abortion clinic violence. 
The people who bombed abortion clinics defended their 
actions with a variety of arguments. These arguments were 
designed to draw attention away from the bombings and to the 
42 The bombers hold the belief that the evil of 
abortion is so great that the bombings are completely 
acceptable. To them, bombing an abortion clinic is simply 
removing a "place of evil". 
43 Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives 
Abortion Clinic Violence Washington, DC: US Government 
Printing Office, 1987, p. 625 
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abortion debate itself. These contentions were meant to 
rationalize a type of action that has been condemned whenever 
they have occurred. If one is to pull back from the issue at 
hand, abortion, and look at the larger issue, violent action, 
one thing is clear: No matter what the stated cause, the use 
of violent political action in the U.S. has always served to 
cloud the legitimacy of the cause at hand. 
It may be felt by many Americans that abortion is wrong, 
but they also view violence as an ·unacceptable means by which 
to achieve that goal. Whatever moral high ground may be held 
by the pro-life movement, in the public view, it tends to be 
lost when they resort to the use of violence. 
One of the first claims by the bombers is that they have 
a higher moral authority than do the abortionists they are 
trying to close down. Mr. Scheidler uses the argument that the 
bombings are done out of a greater love of all men. He states: 
To talk a person out of doing abortions or to put 
him ·out of business shows greater love than 
excusing what he does. We tell abortionists that 
what they do is wrong. Who loved Herod? John the 
Baptist, who pointed out his evil and told him to 
repent, or Herodias who asked for the head of John. 
John tried to convert Herod, Herodias merely wanted 
the Baptist silenced. Throughout history, it has 
42 
I 
/ 
been those who really love who try to convert 
people. from evil to good. 44 
The failure of this argument is that it is based on a standard 
that is not shared among the American public. Not every 
American is a firm believer in the teachings of the Bible. For 
the pro-life movement to base American society on the 
teachings of the Bible is faulted·. American civil and criminal 
law is not based on a particular religious theory, but a broad 
secular theory. To use the Bible as a sole determinant for 
action and then to expect the opposition to accept that 
doctrine is absurd. Wh~ther the opposition (the pro-6hoice 
movement) accepted the Bible as a guide for social conduct is 
irrelevant. The laws that govern this nation are interpreted 
from the Constitution, not the Bible. 
A second argument for abortion clinic violence is that 
they are righteous vigilantes. Those doing the bombing felt 
that the system had not storped abortion and that it was up to 
them to act. Those seeking to destroy Planned Parenthood 
clinics were seeking to rid the nation of what they believed 
to be slaughterhouses. They felt that justice was being. denied 
to the innocent. 45 For many, there is no difference from a 
44 Schidler, Joseph M. "Pro-Life Extremist Tactics are 
Necessary'' Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution New 
York: Harper & Row, 1987, p. 172 
45 IBID p . 19 0 
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lynch mob hanging a guilty man as there is to bombing a 
clinic. Mr. Scheidler uses the analogy of Nazi concentration 
camps: 
I don't condemn them, [abortion clinic bombers] I 
don't promote them. What we've seen is some damaged 
real estate ... It's like bombing Dachau and getting 
away without hurting anyone46 
This, as the first argument, fails to support the use of 
violence, since each side is playing by different rules. 
Abortion can only be seen as immoral and wrong if one adheres 
to the religious doctrine stated in the Bible. Since the pro-
choice movement has not adopted the religious doctrine and 
instead opted for a medical viewpbint, the Bible argument is 
irrelevant to the latter. In addition to this, the pro-choice 
movement always takes great offense to allusions to Nazi 
Germany47 • The pro-life movement has portrayed abortion as 
the American Holocaust, and that abortion is simply another 
form of genocide. 
Hitler used racial grounds to exterminate Jews and 
other "undesirable." The reproductive rights 
movement has no genocidal component-no one is out 
to kill all embryos. It is an insult to the ~emory 
of the alive and conscious human beings murdered by 
46 IBID p . 19 4 
47 It is an interesting side note to history that 
Hitler banned abortion in Nazi Germany. This ban on abortion 
was designed so that Hitler would be able to increase the 
population of Nazi Germany. 
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the Nazis to equate than with embryos for anti-
abortion propaganda48 
The strategy of abortion bombings itself failed. By 1986 
and 1987, the number of incidents had dwindled greatly. In 
1986, there were three cases of arson and two bombings for the 
first eleven and a half months of the year. 49 As the costs 
versus the gains were taken into account, it soon became clear 
that the bombing campaign was a lost cause to the militant 
elements. By 1986, they staged fewer and fewer bombings. 
The failure of the bombing campaign has many root causes. 
The concept of direct action itself was not accepted by all 
factions of the pro-life movement. The NRLC never condoned the 
abortion bombings, and thus deprived the campaign of broad 
based, legitimate support. Many felt that the use of violehce 
was wrong, even if it achieved the desired goals. It was also 
felt that the pro-life movement had not exhausted all the 
legal means available to it. The use of domestic terrorism 
could be rationalized only if every other means of legal 
recourse were completely exhausted. 
48 
"Legal Abortion:Arguments Pro & Con" Choice 1983 p. 
4 
49 Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives 
Abortion Clinic Violence Washington, DC: US Government 
Printing Office, 1987, p. 675 
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In the November 23, 1984 ed
ition, USA Today's editors 
wrote: 
There are many legitimate, le
gal methods anti-
abortionists can use to t
ry and sway public 
opinion. They can take a 
positive approach by 
providing counseling service
s for young, pregnant 
women who may be tempted to c
hoose abortion because 
they aren't aware of alterna
tives. 
They can lobby for a change 
in the law. They can 
hold marches and peaceful
 protest. They can 
distribute literature and s
peak out through the 
media. 
But no one has the righ
t to resort to 
terrorism in an attempt to f
orce change. rhat's an 
irrational means of making 
an otherwise rational 
point. 
Those who oppose abortion h
ave the right to 
protest its legality. But 
they also have the 
obligation not to cross th
e line between free 
speech and harassment-and the
 line between peaceful 
protest and outright terroris
m. 50 
By resorting to violent and il
legal actions, the pro-life 
movement lost the moral hig
h ground to which that it 
lay 
claim. They have always acc
used the pro-choice movement
 of 
violence (the murder of unborn child
ren) and yet they resorted 
to violent acts. By giving i
n to the extremists of the 
pro-
life movement, they riske
d losing the more moder
ate 
"mainstream" followers. 
so Houbeck, Robert J. "Abortio
n Clinic Bombings are Not 
Justified" Quarrels That Have Shape
d the Constitution New 
York: Harper & Row, 1987, p. 
187 
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In a sense> the bombing campaign made the entire abortion 
debate ugly to the American people. The debate started as a 
discussion based on legal and religious debate and had become 
"street fighting". People were willing to have protest marches 
and brochures that were protected under the Constitution, but 
no one wanted bombings and violence. The editors of the News 
American (Baltimore-) wrote: "The abortion issue is always 
going to be controversial, always going to be bitter. But it 
was inconceivable that anyone would resort to terrorism. 
1151 
The sheer number of abortion clinics in the United States 
also contributed to the failing of the bombing campaign. It is 
irrational to thin·k that every clinic could be closed by 
bombing. There was a small finite core of people who were 
willing to carry out these bombing. It would not take long for 
law enforcement authorities to catch them and end the 
bombings. Even if they managed to close 1 or 100 clinics there 
were others that would be rebuilt to replace them. 
The bombers also had bad timing in an historical sense. 
With the bombing of the Marine compound in Beirut .in 1983 and 
the West Berlin disco 
. 
in 198 6 52 
. I Americans had a 
51 Collins, Carol L. Abortion: The Continuing 
Controversy New York: Facts on File, 1984, p. 83 
52 This bombing of a disco in West Berlin was the 
low 
Reagan Administration's justification of the air raid on 
Libya in April of 1986. This air raid was seen by President 
Reagan as a direct response to the state sponsored terrorism 
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tolerance for terrorism; it soon became clear that the bombers 
had taken the wrong approach. In the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 
the editors wrot~: 
Terrorism is terrorism, ·whether it is in 
Northern Ireland, Lebanon or Maryland. And there is 
certainly no place for terrorism in the United 
States ... What terrorists have in common all over 
the world is a dedication to a principle so single-
minded that it obscures whatever validity there is 
in the cause being promoted. That has become true 
of the IRA bombers and assassins in the British 
Isles, of Islamic Jihad and of those who carry 
their opposition to abortion to violent extremes in 
this country. 53 
The bombing campaign also proved to be counterproductive 
for the entire pro-life movement, even for those who were not 
involved. By association, the bombers cast the entire pro-life 
movement in a negative, extremist light. When the bombings 
started, some people felt that the pro-life was starting to 
fight a lost cause. Unless they were losing, why else would 
they resort to such extreme actions, the rational would go. By 
giving the pro-life movement an appearance of failure and 
desperate action, they risked alienating many people who were 
casual supporters. 
of Libya's Colonel Quadiffi~ 
53 Collins, Carol L. Abortion: The Continuing 
Controversy New York: Facts on File, 1984, p. 82 
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The overall failure of the bombing campaign is c
lear due 
to the reasons given. It wa~ counter productive
, and served 
only to alienate the very people it was trying t
o recruit. We 
must note that the bombing campaign was never 
part of the 
mainstream pro-life movement. However, while 
the pro-life-
movement did not condone the bombings, they did
 not condemn 
them either. Atcording to Jerry Faweli
54
·, he could understand 
how these "people can do these things [fire bombings] wh
en I 
think about what goes on in the back room
s of those 
clinics 1155 
An interesting footnote to the ~bortion clinic b
ombings 
is how the federal government has reacted to 
it. After an 
initial investigation in 1984, the Reagan Admini
stration said 
there was no clear link in the attacks. By" t
reating each 
bombing as an individual attack, the government
's ability to 
carry out a comprehensive investigation was lim
ited. William 
Webster, Director of the FBI said of the bom
bers, "Their 
objective is social'', and declined to tteat the bombings as 
54 Leader of the Moral Majority, a politicai lobbying 
organization that formed durirtg the rise of the 
New Right in 
the 1980s. It was the goal of the Moral Majority to promote 
many of the "traditional values" that were espou
sed by the 
New Right. 
55 IBID p. 8 6 
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terr.or ism. 56 Director Webster made this statement al though 
the FBI defines terrorism as: 
The unlawful use of force or violence against 
persons or property or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political and social objectives. 57 
The handling of the bombings by the federal government 
could be explained in part by the Ne~ Right composition of the 
Reagan Administration. By failing to pursue those responsible 
foi the bombings, one could infer that the Reagan 
Administration was willing to remain quiet, since the bombers 
were after the· same goal as Reagan: the abolition of 
abor:tion. 58 If the government does not speak out against 
these actions, and actively pursue the guilty, it is implied 
that they condoned them to some degree. 59 
But while the bombing may have cost them in terms of 
moral righteousness, the pro-life movement did gain one thing, 
publicity. The pro-life movement ~ot people to think about 
56 
"Onward, Christian Soldiers?" Playboy May 1989, p. 
53 
57 IBID p. 53 
58 It is a thin line however, between ignoring and 
condoning the violence of the abortion protesters. In all 
fairness, one could also assume that the Reagan 
Administration simply did not care about the bombings, and 
was thus not going to waste and time in deal with the 
bombings. 
59 IBID p. 53 
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abortion. Even though the editors of the nation's newspapers 
were condemning the abortion bombings, they were also writin~ 
about abortion. The pro-life movement may have gained 
publicity for themselves, but not much support. The net 
results is that the pro-life movement may have gained more 
publicity, but they still did not have a centralized 
organization. 
51 
Chapter Seven-The Phoney Abortion Clinics 
O what a tangled web we weave, 
when first we practice to deceive 
Scott Pibrech60 
The next tactic taken by the extreme elements of ~he pro-
1 if e movement were less violent, but much more extensive and 
complex. In an effort to adopt a more mainstream and legal 
approachr the pro-life movement started a program of phoney 
abortion clinics. It opened up clinics that would serve to 
advise women seeking abortions. The group felt that if it 
could just talk to the woman, it would be able to dissuade her 
from having an abortion. On the sur.face, the idea seems 
laudable. It is legal, and works within the framework of a 
democratic society. 
The problem that arises is that the clinics were designed 
to be a copy of a real abortion clinic. They would list 
themselves in the phone book under abortion services, and 
would give the appearance of being an abortion clinic. In some 
cases they would choose a name that was similar to one being 
used by an abortion provider in the same area. What would end 
up happening is that people would unwittingly be lured into 
these clinics under false pretenses. 
60 Oxford University Press The Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations ·New York: Oxford University Press, 1980 p. 361 
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Once inside the clinic, the women would be shown graphic 
films and photographs on abortion. After that, they would be 
"counseled" that abortion was a both a sin and morally wrong. 
The women.had, through deception, been forced to listen to the 
arguments of the pro-life movement. The major difference 
between the· phony clinics and a l~gitimate clinic is the 
( 
designed purpose. · 
A legitimate clinic exists to provide women with the many 
options availabl,e to them; adoption, keeping the child or 
abortion. It is the choice of the woman, after consultation, 
to decide whether or not to seek an abortion. By contrast, the 
phoney abortion clinics provides only half the options; that 
of keeping the child or putting it up for adoption. The phoney 
clinics present abortion as a non-option that is not 
permissible under any circumstance. 
The Pearson FoundatioD, a pro-life group, wrote a manual 
called How to Start and Operate Your Own· Pro-Life Outreach 
Crisis Pregnancy Center. The manual gives advice on how and 
where to start up a clinic. For locating the outreach center, 
the manual advises that: 
First of all, you want to check and see if you have 
an abortion chamber located in your area ...... The 
whole idea for this first location is if the girl 
who would be going to the abortion chamber sees 
your office first with a similar name, she will 
probably come into your center. The best part of 
this is that the abortion chamber is paying for 
53 
advertising to bring that girl to you. If you do 
your job well you just might put the abortionist 
out of business. 61 
The manual also gives recommendations on how to choose a 
name for the outreach center so women will think that it is a 
legitimate abortion provider. To be able to g~t women to come 
in, the out-reach center must appear to be an abortion 
provider. With this in mind, the manual states: 
In using a neutral name such as Pregnancy Proble~ 
Center to attract women who want abortion, you are 
not deceiving but being very honest. You are 
looking for the girl with the pregnancy problem and 
if she's thinking of having an abortion, your are 
probably the only one who will offer her all the 
true information on abortion. The abortion mills 
certainly won't give her this information. 62 
The manual also urges that anti-abortion counselors 
I give 
deceptive artswers. Even if a woman is not pregnant, .keeping 
her there is an opportunity for the outreach center to try to 
indoctrinate a woman further and try to gain converts for the 
pro-life viewpoint. 
By tije mid 1980s the problem became so widespread that 
Planned Parenthood and the National Abortion Federation 
61 Cammi ttee on the Judiciary House of 
Representatives Abortion Clinic Violence Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing .Office, 1987, p. 533 
62 IBID p . 5 3 4 
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published a pamphlet that warns of the deception of anti-
abortion counseling centers. The pamphlet points out the 
various methodt5 employed by the anti-abortion center. The 
methods listed include: 
1. They falsely suggest or promise a full range. 
of reproductive services. 
2. They offer free pregnancy tests but give 
ambiguous answers about the results. 
3. They show shocking and deceptive films or 
slide shows. 
4. They attempt to induce guilt by engaging 
women in discussions about their religious 
views and beliefs. 
5. They refuse or fail to provide contraceptive 
information. 
6. They make exaggerated promises of financial 
assistance, medical treatment or other 
arrangements. 63 
This strategy on the part of the pro-life movement 
illustrates the organizational level to which they had 
developed. After abandoning the bombing campaign, the pro-life 
movement moved toward a strategy that was within the legal 
mainstream. The pro-life movement was also moving towards more 
organized actions within the movement. It does not tak~ much 
time or money to bomb an abortion clinic, but it does to mimic 
one. 
63 Planned Parenthood "A Consumers Alert to Deception, 
Harassment & Medical Malpractice" Anti-Abortion Counseling 
Centers New York: Planned Parenthood, 1987, p. 1 
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. 
The phoney abortion clinics were successful for a tim
e 
because they -were so hard to detect and deal with. As 
devious 
as the centers are, they are completely legal. Anyone
 has tpe 
'I 
/ 
right to start a clinic to provide counseling to p
regnant 
women. The problem arises in how the clinic is label
ed. In 
Worcester, Massachusetts, an outreach center posted
 a sign 
saying it was PP Inc. To the average person, it is eas
y to .see 
how some one could mistakenly believe that it meant 
Planned 
Parenthood. 64 
The phoney abortion clinics, unlike the bombing campaig
n, 
were not a complete failure. The phoney clinics howeve
r, would 
not remain a major focus of the pro-life movement. Although 
the clinics were effective in deceiving many, their suc
cess in 
tricking people would be 
• 
a maJor problem. By Planned 
Parenthood's own .estimate, "anti-abortion activists 
set up 
"counseling centers 11 in hundreds of communities acro
ss the 
country .·1165 It was clear that the pro-choice moveme
nt could 
not sit by and allow this deception to go on, so act
ion was 
taken, in the form of lawsuits, to try and close
 these 
Min this case, the out-reach center was forced 
to stop using the PP, Inc. designation by a court 
order. 
65 planned Parenthood "A Consumer's Alert to 
Deception, Harassment & Medical Malpractice" Anti-Abo
rtion 
Counseling Centers New York: Planned Parenthood, 1987
, p. 1 
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clinics. In many cases, the clinics. were prosecuted under the 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 
The outreach centers persist to this day, and with 
varying degrees of success. Some outreach centers are unable 
to obtain medical certification, so they are not allowed to 
perform pregnancy tests or take blood samples. To get around 
this, the center staff will give the client a urine sample 
bottle and the pregnancy test, and the client will have to 
perform the test herself.M 
The outreach centers also 
. 
require a great deal of 
commitment in terms of money and time to operate. Unlike other 
actions taken by the pro-life movement, such as bombings or 
Operation Rescue, the centers require a long term obligation 
from the people involved. Protesting on a street corner for 
one or two Saturdays a month did not match the cost of running 
and staffing a center. The basic failing of the centers is 
that the entire concept is complex in nature and slow to show 
results. The clinics are going to convert people from abortion 
one person at a time. At this rate it would take decades 
before abortion would be outlawed. What the pro-life movement 
66 Synal, Roberta Planned Parenthood 
Communications Director, New York City Office. Telephone 
interview conducted July 26, 1990 
.57 
(; 
needed was a means to bring the issue before the American 
people in all at one time. 
The clinics, when disccivered, also failed to generate the 
widespread condemnation that the fire bombings did. In some 
sense, the clinics could be seen as legitimate. While one 
could question the practice, it was ·1egal, if not underhanded. 
The clinics did provide counseling for women who wished to 
choose an option other than abortion. 
The use of phoney abortion clinics, like fire bombings, 
exist as a unique element of the abortion debate. The 
characteristic nature of the abortion debate has made it 
highly unlikely that o;ther single issue67 conflicts such as 
gun control or tax reform would adopt such strategies as fire 
bombings or phoney abortion clinics. The particular method in 
which abortions are provided in this country, through abortion 
clinics, open up the debate to unique tactics. 
There is no functional equivalent in any of the other 
major single issue debates to an abortion clinic. Through the 
genius of a pro-life movement strategist, the pro-life 
67 
.In this paper, single issue groups are defined as 
those groups who work for the rights of a particular issue. 
Some examples are the National Rifle Association (NRA) which 
works to defend the right to bear arms, the Tobacco 
Institute, which works to promote the rights of smokers. 
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movement was able to have a m~asurable impact on abortion 
providers in certain cities. 
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Chapter Eight-Operation Rescue 
Feel by turns the bitter change of fierce extremes, 
extremes by change more fierce 
John Milton68 
The outreach centers found themselves eclipsed by 
another, more dramatic form of action, the Operation Rescue 
sit-ins. Operation Rescue was the brainchild of Randall Terry, 
a prominent member of the pro-life movement. Mr. Terry is a 
lay minister from Binghamton, New York. He originally started 
sit-ins at abortion centers in 1984 in the Binghamton area. In 
1986, Mr. Terry started Operation Rescue as a nationwide 
protest program. Mr~ Terry was able to mobilize thousands of 
people by building a network of contacts among fundamentalist 
preachers across the country. 
In essence, Operation Rescue was a simple plan. Using a 
locally activated group of protesters (often church groups), 
organizers would block the entrances to abortion clinics using 
the concept of civil disobedience. Taking a lesson fro~ the 
civil rights sit-ins of the .1960's, the protesters sought to 
achieve two goils. The first was to block the entrance to an 
abortion clinic and try to counsel the women trying to 
entering the clinic. The second was to publicize the abortion 
~ Oxford University Press Oxford Dictionary.of 
Quotations New York: Oxford University Press, 1980 p.348 
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debate as best as possible. The highly dramatic, mass media 
style nature of this form of protest served this function 
well. The Operation Rescue sit-ins were designed in large part 
to attract a great deal of media attention. 
The protesters faced arrest on civil disobedience 
charges, and the protest almost always ended with protesters 
being hauled away by the loc~l police department. The standing 
order for Operation Rescue members was that they would not 
resist arrest, would go limp, and force police to carry them 
off. The tactic of going limp during an arrest was meant to 
delay the protest as long as possible. After being arrested, 
the protesters would refuse to give their names to the police, 
or would simply use the names of Baby Jane Doe or Baby John 
Doe, thus tying up the court system. 
Another aspect of the civil disobedience ·tactic was to 
make it look as though the police were the aggressors in the 
case, hauling away passive protesters who were reading Bibles 
and singing hymns. Through careful construction of the protest 
and arrest, Operation Rescue members could present themselves 
as the victim in the whole affair. They wanted to portray the 
image that they were noble in their protest, trying to change 
a system that was wrong. This method was used successfully in 
1960, when Black college students forced the integration of 
lunch counters in Greensboro, NC. 
61 
I 
This desire for press coverage was an important aspect of 
the pro-life movement. With the belief that most of America 
felt as they did but were simply not active, the pro-life 
movement used the media as means to wake up America. Many of 
the tactics, and especially Operation Rescue, were designed in 
part to attract media.attention. 
At times, Operation Rescue had beert very widespread. In 
January of 1989, Operation Rescue hit 28 cities. Mr. Terry 
. I .. himself has been arrested ~ver 30 times, all on counts of 
civil disobedience. !twas Mr. Terry's objective to be .at as 
many protests as possible, to lead them and get arrested. By 
getting arrested, Mr. Terry felt that he could publicize 
Operation Rescue and what it stands for. 
The protests followed two models: the local protest at an 
area abortion clinic; and the mass mobilization for 
concentrated effort to close down all the abortions clinic in 
an entire city. An example of this would be the concentrated 
Operation Resdue in Atlanta, Georgia in 1988. In July of 1988, 
Operation Rescue targeted Atlanta since it was the sight of 
the Democratic Convention. 
At first, the protesters had initial successes. They 
succeeded in closing down some clinics, if only for one 
afternoon. The protest also brought the abortion debate even 
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more into the public arena. But Operation Rescue had many 
failings too. The Civil Rights movement had enjoyed, in the 
late 1960s, some measure of public support. By the 1970s, even 
die hard segregationists in the South were willing to concede 
to the inevitable arrival of integrati~n. With the passage of 
various Civil Rights bills, the United States gradually 
accepted the inevitability of civil rights. There still exists 
great racial division and conflict on how to achieve these 
goals, but most Americans would concede that racial equality 
is an important goal for the United States. 
Abortion, on the other hand, is an issue that has much 
greater divisions in American society. A failure of this 
analogy is that while Civil Rights protesters were fight~ng to 
gain rights·, Operation Rescue is working to remove an existing 
right. 
Many leaders from the Civil Rights era do not like the 
comparison that Mr. Terry makes between his Operation Rescue 
and the protests of the 1960s. Many of these leaders, 
including such people as Andrew Young and Julian Bond, feel 
that Operation Rescue is more like "the segregationists who 
fought desperately to block black Americans from access to 
their rights. 1169 The Civil Rights movement worked to secure 
69 Kurtz, Howard "Operation Rescue: Aggressively 
Antiabortion" Washington Post March 6, ·1989 p. A3 
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more _rights for everyone, not just African-Americans. In 
contrast, the pro-life movement seeks to limit rights for 
everyone, not expand them. 
By 1989, the protesters were starting to be charged under 
the Federal Governments Racketeer Influenced and · Corrupt 
Organization (RICO) laws, since the protesters were seen as 
"using force and threats in a conspiracy to prevent 
abortions". 70 The laws were used in two cases 
• in 
Pennsylvania, one in Pittsburgh and one in Philadelphia. In 
both cases the use of law$ were upheld on appeal, and cash 
damages were awarded to the abortion clinics in question. 
This is important since it reinforces the fact that 
Operation Rescue crossed a certain line. It went from just 
protesting to harassment of those seeking abortions. It 
crossed the line when it verbally attacked those women seeking 
to have an abortion, and from that point they became legally 
abusive. 
In October of 1989, Mr. Terry was sent to ·prison for 
refusing to pay a $1000. 00 fine for criminal trespass and 
unlawful assembly. Mr. Terry received a two year sentence and 
7° Freedman, Eric "Pro-choicers 'adopt' federal 
racketeering law" Detroit (Michigan) News March 7, 1989 
(Located in Newsbank (Microform] Health, 1989 1:AlO, fiche) 
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after he was released from prison, he was banned from t
he 
Atlanta area for two years. 
71 Mr. Terry refused to pay the 
fine, since he said he could not do so in good conscience
.n 
Mr. Terry's problems did not stop with his conviction. In 
February of 1990, Operation Rescue closed it's nation
al 
offices due to heavy debt. The protests were continued at t
he 
local level by people who believe in the example set by M
r. 
Terry, and felt that it is the way that abortion will 
be 
overturned in this country. 
After a time, the protests began to offend.Americans. The 
sit-ins were one th_ing, but the harassment of staff a
nd 
clients was another. A public opinion poll in 1989 a~ked t
he 
question: 
A group that opposes abortion has been holding 
demonstrations where its members block the entrance 
to abortion clinics until the police arrest them 
and carry them off. How do you feel about these 
demonstrations ?n 
71 Mr. Terry reversed himself in January o~ 
1990 when he allowed supports to pay the fine so that he 
could be set .free. During his four months in prison, Mr. 
Terry work on a road gang repairing Georgia's roads. 
72 Schwartz, Jerry "Abortion Protester Jailed 
After Objecting to Fine" New York Times October 6, 1989, A14 
n Opinion Roundup Public Opinion May/June 
1989 p.39 
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Those polled sho~ed that 67% opposed them, 
and only 24% , 
supported them. 74 It became clear that th
e protesters were 
becoming more of annoyance than anything els
e. Part of Terry's 
problem was his personality and approach. U
sing a bullhorn at 
all his marches, he would shout at those w
ho ran the clinic 
and those who sought it's services. During
 his trial, Terry 
denounced the prosecutor, saying that "he
 had betrayed the 
f ai th75 and the blood is on his hand
s. 1176 Terry then 
attempted to launch into a discussion ab
out abortion. The 
judge cut him short, stating. "The issue is trespass
 and 
unlawful assembly. I will listen to anythin
g· you have to -say 
in extenuation or mitigation
1177 The judge later told Terry 
that "I do not need a sermon, sir
1178 
Civil disobedience has proven itself to be 
an effective 
method of protest when used in certain situ
ations. The Civil 
74 IBID p. 39 
75 Terry d9es not explain who's faith the 
prosecutor has betrayed. This is another ex
ample of the 
faulted logic that is illustrated before. A
lthough Terry and 
others may use the Bibte as the sole determ
inant in how to 
conduct their lives, he can not force othe
rs to accept such 
doctrine. It is the Constitution and the US
 Code that are 
• 'I 
the laws of this riation, not the Bible. 
76 Schwartz,· Jerry i1Abortion Protester 
Jailed After Objecting to Fine" New York Times October 
6, 
1989, p. A14 
n IBID p. A14 
78 IBID p. A14 
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rights movement used these methods in such places as the 
Woolworth's lunc.h counter in Greensboro, NC. The success of 
such tactics is based in large part on the popular support 
that groups gain. Although the Greensboro protesters met with 
much opposition, they were successful. If they are able to 
invoke sympathy from the community at large, or at least an 
active minority, they will stand some chance of achieving 
success in the goal of banning abortion. 
In the world of the mass media, where the protesters are 
seen only . in 20 sound bites, they are not just 
protesters, but combatants. They go beyond protest and give 
the impression of someone trying to impose a position by force 
of numbers. Had the protesters stopped at just civil 
disobedience, they ·may have been able to develop a more 
positive media 
. image. By turning civil disobedience into 
confrontational civil disobedience, the result is that they 
put a greater distance between themselves and the public that 
they sought to influence. 
Over time however, Operation Rescue could serve the goals 
of the pro-life movement. Like the fire bombings, the action 
forced the issue of abortion before the American public. After 
people forgot the unsavoriness of the actions, they would 
remember that the underlying issue was abortion. In this 
sense, Operation Rescue was very successful. It brought 
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abortion to middle America every night through the 6 o'clock 
news. The failing of Operation _Rescue was that they quite 
simply did not know when to stop. 
When Operation Rescue first started, it grabbed the 
headlines and was very dramatic. In many ways, Operation 
Rescue was custom made for the evening news. It was dramatic 
and very visual. It appealed to the raw emotion of almost 
every person who saw it. Few people would remain untouched by 
the emotion and the controversy that surrounded the abortion 
debate. 
But as time went on, and the protests occurred every 
weekend and . in more and more cities, people became 
des.ensitized to the debate. The visual impact of Operation 
Rescue was being lost, and people· began to tire of seeing it 
every night on television. The initial impact of Operation 
Rescue striking 20 cities at .once was replaced by protests 
every weekehd. This method of donstant protest served to dull 
the dramatic impact of Operation Rescue. It became, in a word, 
commonplace. 
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Chapter Nine-Lobbying State and Federal Government 
Die politik ist keine Wissenchaft ... sondern eine kenst 
Politics is not a science ... but an art 
Prince Bismarck~ 
One aspect of the abortion debate that does not grab the 
headlines, but still has a major impact, is the lobbying of 
government at all levels. Both the pro-life movement and the 
pro-choice movement have developed various means of garnishing 
the support of politicians. On the pro-life movement side, the 
NRLC set up a political action committee (PAC) to help elect 
pro-life movement candidates at all levels. 
By running candidates, the prq-life movement has sought 
to bring about the changes in government that will get 
abortion banned. One of the best successes of the NRLC-PAC was 
the election of pro-life movement candidates in the Missouri 
Legislature that worked to pass the Webster Bill in 1988. It 
was that bill that brought about the challenge to Roe v. Wade 
by Webster v. Reproductive Services. 
N Oxford University Press Oxford Dictionary of 
Quotations New York: Oxford University Press, 1980 p. 84 
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Another way in which political involvement is important 
is in the formal power that comes ~ith political office. One 
of the major effects of the Reagan Presidency was his role in 
changing the composition of the Federal judiciary. From 1981-
1989, Reagan appointed one-third of the Supreme Court and more 
than half of the Federal Judgeships. 80 This was to have 
impact on what cases would be brought before the Supreme Court 
for review. 
The pro-choice movement .is also very active in political 
lobbying. Planned Parenthood (PP), one of the larger of the 
·pro-choice movement groups, spends a great amount of time in 
monitoring legislation at the state and local levels, and aids 
in the drafting of legislation that further reproductive 
rights. PP, along with such groups as the National Abortion 
Rights Action League (NARAL) also maintain lobbyists to 
promote their cause. 
Another action that is often taken by both sides is the 
fili~g of amicus curiae briefs in lawsuits that come before 
state and federal courts. This method -of attack meets with 
varying degrees of success. The pro-choice movement has been 
very successful in getting restraining orders against 
Operation Rescue .(who then ignore them) and in the 
80 Tribe, Laurence H. Abortion: The Clash of 
Absolutes New York: W.W. Norton, 1990 p. 167 
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racketeering cases that were won in Pennsylvania. The pro-
choice movement was not successful, however, in convincing the 
Supreme Court to overturn Webster. 
Both sides are also involved in providing (or 
withholding) support for judges and others who have to appear 
before a Senate confirmation hearing. As with amicus curiae 
briefs, political support for a nomination can let U. s. 
Senators know where a group stands on a person's nomination. 
The impact is that groups such as NRLC and NARAL represent 
thousands of potential votes, and thus they have some impact 
on the political process. 
The pro-life movement has met with the same degree of 
success in using legal action. In certain cases, such as 
Webster, they somesuccess, but they have failed to overturn 
Roe. Both sides have used these tactics, but they do not to 
get a lot of media coverage. ~ather such actions like these 
are low key in nature, and success (for either side) is often 
measured in terms of months and years. There also have been 
major setbacks. For the pro-life movement, they have failed to 
pass an amendment to the Constitution. that would ban abortion. 
But while tactics such as this may not garner the headlines, 
they have been proven to be the most successful in the long 
run. 
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The success of political lobbying .stems fro~
 the fact 
that such tactics are seen as working "with
in the system". 
Every single issue group has used this app
roach, for the 
simple fact that it works. The one element tha
t is needed for 
such tactics to be successful is money. The es
tablishment of 
PAC's, .public information campaigns and lobbyin
g of individual 
legislators can prove to be very expensive. G
iven the large 
cost of running for, and keeping a leg is la t
i ve seat, the 
incentive to accept campaign contributions can
 be immense. 
Through this arrangement, the pro-life movem
ent (or the 
pro-choice movement) can further their cause, and 
the 
legislator is able to stay in office. The mo
ney needed for 
such a strategy is maintained through contr
ibutors to the 
cause. One of the problems that faces each sid
e is the image 
that they project of their group. For the pro-life movement
, 
such strategies as the fire bombings and Op
eration Rescue, 
have given the movement an extremist hue. The 
mainstream pro-. 
life groups, such as the National Right to Lif
e, have to work 
to distance themselves from the actions of t
he more active 
members of the movement. °In ttis case, the 
actions of the 
protesters and fire bombers may have done more 
harm than good. 
There is a choice to limit their contributor 
pool to a 
small hard core group that will support su
ch tactics as 
Operation Rescue, or to soften the edges of th
e movement and 
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appeal to a larger section of mainstream America in asking for 
funds. The problem with the first choice is that the pool from 
which contributions can be drawn is limited. By choosing to 
appeal to a broader cross section of America, and toning down 
the attack in the ·process, they risk losing the small 
supportive core that has been their base. These are problems 
that beset not only the pro-life movement, but also the pro-
choice movement. The pro-choice movement has been given the 
image (by the pro-life movement) of being left wing·extremists 
who lobby for abortion on demand. While the pro-choice 
movement does have elements within it that support this 
position, it is not the only position. Like the pro-life 
movement, the pro-choice movement covers a broad spectrum of 
. 
views. 
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Chapter Ten-The Pro~choice Movement 
Those who .expect to reap the blessings of freedom, must, 
like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it. 
Thomas Paine81 
During the erttire abortion debate, the pro-choice 
movement spent a great amount of time on the sidelines. Aside 
from protest marches, it did not engage in many direct, 
combative actions as did the pro-life movement. The actions 
taken by the pro-choice movement tend to fall more into 
"behind the scenes" workings. With the legalization of 
abortion under Roe v. Wade, the pro-choiqe movement worked to 
make abortion accessible to all. 
While Roe made abortion legal, it made no provision for 
easy or equal access to abortion. Groups, such as Planned 
Parenthood, sought to make abortions and family planning 
services available to as many people as possible. The pro-
choice movement has also worked to get federal funding for 
abortions reinstated under Title X, a federal program that 
provided funds for family planning. Title X was cut in the 
1980s after lobbying of Congressman by the pro-life movement. 
81 t L J D P t ' Q t t ' N Y k Pe er, aurence . r. e er sue a ions ew or: 
Bantam Books, 1977 p. 203 
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The pro-choice movement also has had to work to provide 
a place for women to .seek abortions. In some parts of the 
country, such as South Dakota and Minnesota, there are very 
few doctors or clinics at which to obtain an abortion. As part 
of its fight for abortion, the pro-choice movement has worked 
to provide clinics and doctors to furnish these abortions. 
Much of this has been funded through donations to Planned 
Parenthood and other organizations. 
The pro-choice movement also has worked within the court 
system to combat challenges to abortion laws by the pro-life 
movement. The pro-choice movement has spent a large amount of 
time and money to work to maintain the legality of abortions 
laws at all levels of government. The pro-choice movement has 
worked at the state and federal level to combat the 
introduction of bills 
. 
in legislatures and referendums on 
election ballets that seek to limit abortion. 
The pro-choice movement has ~lso mobilized its forces to 
fight abortion bills that have already passed (as in the case 
of Pennsylvania) and bills that are awaiting the signature of 
a governor. In the past two years, three ·such bills have come 
before governors. In Louisiana, Governor Buddy Romer vetoed an 
anti-abortion bill that would have been the most restrictive 
in the country. Governor Romer, a pro-life movement supporter, 
vetoed the bill because he said there were not enough 
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provisi~ns for cases of rape or incest. Governor Romer also 
faced pressure from pro-choice movement groups, who said that 
if he signed the bill, he would be slated for defeat by pro-
choice movement forces. 
The second state, Idaho, served to better illustrate the 
influence of the pro-choice movement. The Idaho Legislature, 
like Louisiana, passed a highly restrictive abortion bill. 
Pro-choice movement forces told Governor Cecil Anders that if 
he signed the abortion bill, the pro-choice movement would 
start a nationwide boycott of Idaho potatoes. Given that 
potatoes were a major crop in Idaho, Governor Anders felt 
pressured into vetoing the bill, which he did. Whether such a 
boycott would have been successful is open to debate. What is 
important is that the. pro-choice movement was able to mobilize 
and make it's position known to Governor Anders. 
The third state, Utah, passed a bill with l.ittle 
opposition in the state l~gislature. The Governor, faced wiih 
the threat of a boycott of Utah's ski industry, signed the 
bill anyway. Utah, however, is a ·unique case in terms of state 
politics. The government and state of Utah is dominated by the 
influence of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 
(LOS). Since the LOS holds that abortion is wrong in almost 
all cases, the bill had little trouble in getting passed. 
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In larg·e part, Utah. can not be used to describe the 
qebate at the state level, due to the unique religious and 
political circumstances of that state. Utah, both religiously 
and ethnically, is a highly homogenous state. Utah lacks the 
ethnic, cultural and political diversity of a state such as 
California or New York. In this way, the view towards abortion 
is shared by most citizens of Utah. 
The law is also unique in that it has its own fail safe 
mechanism. If the law is found to be unconstitutional in 
federal court, a second, less restrictive law is automatically 
enacted. In this way, the pro-life movement has protected 
itself, in some way, from the threat of legal challenge from 
the pro-choice movement. 
It is still too soon to see what effect the Utah law will 
have. It was written in part to be a challenge to Roe v Wade; 
it is felt by some (including Utah Governor Norman Bangerter) 
that it has a good chance of providing that challenge. 
In this way, the pro-choice movement illustrated the 
forces that it could muster if needed. While many accused 
Governor Anders of giving in to pressure, he may have done it 
in part to preserve Idaho's economic livelihood. There are 
many factors that affected his decision to veto the bill. 
While one could argue about how much impact the threatened 
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boycott had, there can be little debate that it had some 
influence on Governor Anders decision. 
It is tactics such as these that the pro-choice movement 
can use to preserve abortion rights. It must be understood 
that the pro-choice movement is not always successful·. In the 
same kind of batt.le in Pennsylvania, the pro-choice movement 
was unable to get the bill vetoed, and Pennsylvartia now has 
the second most restrictive abortion law in the United 
States. 82 
82 This does not include the Isl~nd of Guam, 
which is a U.S. protectorate, and passed the most 
restrictive abortion law. 
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Chapter Eleven-The Protest Marches 
What is this the sound and rumor? 
What is this all men hear? 
Like the wind in hollow valleys, 
when the storm is drawing near 
Like the rolling on of an ocean, 
in the even tide of fear 
'Tis the people marching on 
William Morris83 
As stated before, much of this paper deals with the 
tactics of the pro-life movement, since it was most active in 
the debate over abortion. There is one area, however, where 
the pro-choice movement has been most involved in presenting 
its case and showing its numbers. This is in the area of 
protest marches. By the beginning of 1988, the pro-choice 
movement saw that its position, in terms of access to 
abortion, was being seriously challenged by pro-life movement 
legislation. 
Due to the changing _make up of the Supreme Court, the 
pro-life movement was able to launch it's first real ~ttack on 
Roe v. .Wade. This attack was in the farm of Webster v. 
Reproductive Services. After the long term lobbying of 
legislators at the state level, the pro-li_fe movement was able 
to make some gains. One of the biggest gains was made in 
83 William Morris Oxford University Press Oxford 
Dictionary of Quotations New York: Oxford University Press, 
1980 p.358 
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Missouri, where pro-life legislators were able to pass a 
highly restrictive abortion bill, known informally as Webster. 
The pro-choice movement decided that the best way to deal 
with the new d~velopment was to mobilize its members. One of 
the methods chosen was to have a large protest march to 
illustr~te the power and extent of the pro-choice movement. 
The first . maJor pro-choice movement march was held 
• 1n 
Washington, DC. on April 9, 1989. This march was held in 
conjunction with marches in other cities across the country . 
The march drew more than 300,000 people on the Mall 
• 1n 
Washington. The march was scheduled to· coincide with the 
opening arguments before the Supreme Court in th·e case of 
Webster v. Reproductive Services. 
As impressive as the protest march was in illustrating 
the size of the pro~choice movement, it was not effective in 
persuading the Supreme Court to strike down Webster v. 
Reproductive Services. This lack of impact stems from the fact 
that Supreme Court Justices are not supposed to be influenced 
by public opinion, but only by the legal questions presented 
within the case. The marches were more effective in showing 
the American public at large the size of the pro-choice 
movement. 
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As a tactic, the protest marches proved to be effectiv
e 
to a point. The protest marches provided a means by whi
ch they 
can show the scope of their power. Having that many p
eople in 
the same place also makes it easy to ·recruit active
 members 
and solicit funds to support ~ctivities. The failing i
s that, 
as a tactic, protest marches are limited. 
The protest march proves effective only when it is u
sed 
in conjunction with other strategies. An example could be th_e 
use of the protest march in addition to a nat
ionwide 
advertising campaign on television to state the posi
tion of 
the pro-choice movement. This applies not only to the 
marches, 
but to any strategy used in the abortion debate. 
In fear of an erosion of rights, the pro-choice movem
ent 
staged another mass demonstration in Washington, 
DC. On 
November 13, 1989 150,000 people turned out again t
o show 
their concern for abortion rights. Added to this w
as the 
intense activity in terms of the public relations. T
he pro-
choice movement and the pro-life movement both went all
 out to 
influence public opinion and the legislation being draw
n up at 
both ~he state and local levels~ 
The effectiveness of the marches was not lost on the pr
o-
life movement. It quickly realized the impact of the 
visual 
' 
imagery of all those pro-choice movement proteste
rs, and 
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sought to capitalize on it. Every year the pro-life movement 
h~ld a rally on the anniversary of the Roe v Wade decision. In 
addition to those rallies, the pro-life movement held a major 
march in Washington, DC to show their numbers-. On April 28, 
--
200,000 marches came to Washington to show their 
opposition to abortion. Speaking to the protesters by 
telephone, President Bush said: 
Your presence on the Mall today reminds all of us 
in Government that Americans from all walks of life 
are committed to preserving the sanctity of human 
life ... ! urge you to continue to work for the day 
when respect for human life is sacrosanct and 
beyond questionM 
The protest marches were impressive in terms of the 
numbers of people they could field, but there is no indication 
as to the long term effectiveness of such actions. The marches ) 
tend to be dramatic and will be in the news for a week or so, 
but what is needed ~s long term. and large scale dedication to 
the cause on either side. 
However, for every protester that showed u~, there were 
scores who supported the cause but did not attend the march. 
If a protest march of 200,000 is effective in influencing 
public opinion, then a march of 406,ooo is twice as effective. 
84 Toner, Robin 11 200,000 Demonstrate Against 
Abortion" New York Times April 29, 1990 p. 1 
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The problem is in getting these people mobilized, whether it 
is to march or to vote. This could be due to the fact that 
most Americans are not that motivated when it comes to the 
issue of abortion. The issue is not pressing enough that they 
would devote time for a protest march. 
The Webster decision has become one of the most important 
milestones in the abortion debate. It was the first time in 
Roe's 16 year history that it was seriously challenged by any 
lawsuit. It was also the first court case that placed any 
effective limitations on abortion after Roe v. WadeJ Although 
Roe v. Wade is hardly a carte blanc for unlimited abortion, it 
does offer a great degree of personal freedom to women. After 
Webster, that freedom faced great challenge. 
The Missouri law had two major parts that were a direct 
challenge to Roe v. Wade. The first part stated that no state 
facilities or state employees could perform abortions. The 
second part of the law required that a physician had to 
determine the viability of a fetus over 20 weeks old. That the 
Supreme Court was willing to hear a case that was a direct 
challenge to Roe v .. Wade galvanized the pro-choice movement. 
The Missouri law was drawn up in part to start a test case 
before the Supreme Court. As with the prior 16 years, the pro-
life movement sought to bring challenges to Roe v. Wade before 
the Supreme Court, in hopes of having Roe v. Wade overturned. 
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The impact of the Webster decision was not so much the 
impact in Missouri85 , but the i~plication for the rest of the 
country. After Webster was announced, many felt that there 
would be a flurry of legislation to limit abortion in many 
states.. In the week after the ruling, Time summed up the 
feelings of the nation: 
Pro-life groups, energized by the hope of 
overturning Roe and pro-choice forces, galvanized 
by fear of that prospect, vow to turn every 
election in every state into a referendum on the 
issue. Both sides claim the moral high ground, but 
the battle will surely be fought at a lower-a much 
lower-level. One side accuses the other of baby 
killing, showing picture of fetuses contorted in 
pain as ·surgical instruments poke at them; the 
other warns of the enslavement of women by states 
if they force those who become pregnant to remain 
that wa_y. 86 
Interestingly though, none of this came about. Although 
there was much talk of states greatly limiting access to 
abortion, it never happened. Only one state, Pennsylvania, 
passed a new anti-abortion bill, and that bill is still faciDg 
an injunction by a Federal Judge. The Island of Guam, a US 
possession, also passed a restrictive abortion bill, but that 
still only makes two states or territories that have put in 
bills, (or had bills) since last year. Abortiort remains today 
85 There is of course the implication for 
the reproductive freedom of the women of Missouri. The 
intent of this chapter however, is to address the nation-
wide issue of abortion availability. 
86 Carbon, Margaret "The Battle Over Abortion" Time 
July 17, 1989 p. 62 
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as it did last year. It faces great threats, but none of those 
threats have come tb pass. Both Louisiana and Idaho put forth 
restrictive bills, and both were vetoed by the state 
governors. Utah, like Pennsylvania, has passed a restrictive 
bill. One of the questions that arises is whether people 
·really want to have abortion banned in the United States, or 
are the content with the status quo. 
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Chapter Tweleve-Influencing ~ublic:Opinion 
Up and down, 
And in the end it's only round and round an
d round, 
Haven't you heard, 
It's a battle of words the ~aster bearer c
ried 
Pink Floyd 7 
While all this was going on, there was a 
great deal of 
"information dissemination. While less gla
morous than fire 
bombings or mass protests, it still serves 
a vital function. 
Throughout the entire ~bortion debate, po
litical literature 
has served th~ major purpose of informing the public, wi
nning 
converts to the cause, and influencing gover
nmental decisions. 
This information campaign has taken 
the form of 
brochures, flyers, billboards, newspapers a
nd annual reports. 
In many ways, this is where the issue is 
being fought. The 
public information departments of both the 
pro-life movement 
and pro-choice movement are very active in tr
ying to influence 
public opinion at the local and federal lev
e·1. 
For the pro-life movement, the object is simple; convince
 
people that abortion should be banned. The a
pproach to this is 
to use a combination of religious arguments 
and moral debates 
to illustrate why abortion is fundamentall
y wrong. The pro-
87 Pink Floyd The Darkside of the Moon Capitol
 Records, 
4XAS 11163, 1973 
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life movement has to divide its target audience into various 
groups, and approach them with different arguments. It would 
be ineffective to use a strict moral doctrine approach upon 
people who are not very religious. Rather an approach that 
shows that life begins at conc~ption might prove to be more 
effective. 
For the pro-choice movement, the challenge is to 
illustrate the threat that the pro-life movement poses and to 
expose the tactics that are .employed by the pro-life movement. 
The pro~choice movement also has· to show the importance of 
keeping abortion legc3:l. There is much variety among the 
various flyers and brochures that are sent out each year. 
Each side needs to approach the general public with as 
broad an appeal as possible. For the ·pro-choice mo.vement, this 
means convincing people of the dangers of having abortion 
banned. The threat of back alley abortions and unsafe medical 
procedures must be shown. In addition, the pro-choice movement 
must try to portray the pro-life movement as zealots trying 
to take away the rights of Americans. 
One of the big means of informing the public is through 
the newspapers and magazines that are published by each side. 
One of the major pub'rications put out by the pro-life movement 
is the National Right to Life News. The paper addresses issues 
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across the country and follows such issues as campaign races 
and the actions of the pro-choice movement. 
:, The pro-life movement produces films that are designed to 
dissuade people from seeking abortions. The most famous of 
these films . lS Silent Scream. The film depict~ a fetus 
undergoing an abortion, and it is meant to illustrate the 
suffering of the fetus. 
On the pro-choice movement side, NARAL publishes its own 
newsletter, which is designed along the lines of the pro-life 
newsletter. Many of these newsletters and flyers are handed 
out at the pro-choice protest marches. At the pro-choice 
movement rally in April. of 1989, the entire spectrum of 
political thought could be seen. AR88A[ 3ome of the groups in 
attendance were the Socialist Worker Party, the Young 
Communist League and Young Socialist Alliance. Although 
different in political . view, they shared a common view on 
abortion. 
What is important is that this is one of the major means 
by which each side has sought to influence public opinion. 
Neither side wi·11 be able to enact it's goals unless it has 
broad based support from the public at. large. In this respect, 
each side has been successful to some degree. The most success 
has been obtained when it used a mainstream approach, and 
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abandoned the more radical methods. Few people want to be 
subjected to photographs of aborted fetuses or fundamental 
religious doctrine. A more successful approach has been to 
present their viewpoint on abortion in a methodical manner and 
to influence converts through rational reasoning. 
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Chapter Thirteen-Conclusions 
My interest is in the future 
because I am 
going to spend the rest of my
 life there 
Charles F. Kettering~ 
There are few real measures 
as to· who is winning the 
abortion debate. Because of t
he fluid nature of the· debat
e, 
success can be fleeting. When 
Webster was handed do~n in Jul
y 
of 1989, many predicted the 
fall of Roe. That has yet t
o 
materialize. It is clear howe
ver, that inroads have been ma
de 
by both sides. For the pro-li
fe movement, the resignation 
of 
William Brennan from the Supre
me Court and the appointment 
of 
David Souter gives new hope to
 the pro-life movement that R
oe 
v. Wade will be overturned. 
The aftermath of the decision 
in Webster v. Reproductive 
Services can be seen by· both 
sides as a battle won. The pr
o-
life movement has won. some 
restrictions on abortion, 
89 but 
not as much as hoped for. For 
the pro-choice movement, Roe 
-v. 
Wade is still standing, and 
the initial threat to Roe h
as 
served to unite the pro-choice
 movement to take a more activ
e 
role in defending it. 
88 oxford University Press Oxfor
d Dictionary of 
Quotations New York: Oxford Univers
ity Press, 1980 p. 387 
89 Although .none of the laws ena
cted, such 
as Pennsylvania's, or the one
s being debated in the state 
house have been enforced. The
y still must face the gauntle
t 
of courtroom trials and appea
ls. 
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But there are also major factors that have to be taken 
into account. In the year since Webster, there has n
ot been 
the . maJor flood of anti-abortion legislation that 
was 
expected. Both Louisiana and Idaho had bills tha
t were 
defeated by governors who were more pragmatic than th
ey were 
pro-life. Bob Martinez, governor of Florida, called a·
special 
session of th~ Florida Legislature and did not get on
e anti-
abortion measure brought to the floor to be passed. 
For now 
the abortion debate still s~ems to be a draw. Only two 
states, 
Pennsylvania and Utah have. passed laws, and each are 
waiting 
to face a legal challenge. However their entrance i
nto the 
debate may provide the cha1lenge to Roe v. Wade t
hat is 
needed. 
If nothing else, some measure of the abortion debate c
an 
be seen in the results of public opinion polls. Usin
g polls 
from the Gallup Organization, the position on aborti
on has 
remained surprisingly stable. The .chart illustrates und
er what 
conditions people feel that abortions should be allow
ed: 
1975 1985 1988 
Legal Under 
any Circumstances- 22% 22% 24% 
Only Some 56% 57% 58% 
Illegal Under all 
Circumstances 23% 22% 17% 
90 Opinion Roundup .Public Opinion May/June 
1989 p.36 
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1989 
28% 
53% 
19%90 
One cannot of course divine public opinion on aborti
on 
from one, ten or a hundred polls. The polls only repr
esent a 
sampling of the American public. Given the contro
versial 
nature of abortion, people may also be quite guard
ed with 
their response to such a question. What is important
 is that 
legal abortion, although greatly challenged, still e~
ists as 
a right under the Constitution. The challenges to a
bortion 
have ·been many and varied, but none have yet unseated
 it. 
If anything, the pro-life movement has be~n losi
ng 
ground. One of the major problems with th~ debate is that it 
cannot be reduced to a simple yes or nci question on a
 chart. 
There are too many factors involved to ask a such ques
tion and 
expect an accurate reflection of public opinion. 
Socio-
economic background, living conditions, emotional stat
e of the 
mother, birth defects arid others all play a role in ob
scuring 
the abortion debate. 
In part, some of this can be due to the tactics employ
ed 
by each side, especially the pro-life movement. Through
out the 
1980s, the pro-life 111ovement has sought to impart
 their 
religious/moral standards concerning abortion onto a
 nation 
that had not especially changed it's position over the
 past 15 
years. Most Americans view abortion with a mix
ture of 
.emotions. Of those polled, 61% of Americans feel that a
bortion 
is morally wrong, 62% think that abortion is murder, 
but 78% 
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of that survey feel that it is a dec
ision to be made by the 
woman. 
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One of the first and overall failing
s of the pro-life 
movement is its inability to de
part from it's rigid 
fundamentalist dogma. The prime doc
trine of the pro-life 
movement is ground~d in the moral argum
ent that life begins at 
conception and thus abortion is murder
. The pro-life movement 
has stood by this belief as the keyst
one to the entire pro-
life movement platform. By being unwil
ling or unable to soften 
or limit this religious rhetoric, 
the pro-life movement, 
either by accident or design, has 
served to alienate a 
substantial part of the American popu
lation. 
The pro-life movement has been succ
essful in bringing 
abortion to the forefront of American p
olitics. Most Americans 
are now aware, in some sense, of the a
bortion debate and what 
is at stake. The pro-life movement has
 been very successful in 
getting some people to think of abort
ion in graphic terms of 
the operation that is performed. It ha
s moved the debate away 
from the clinical, legal debate that
 was carried on by the 
pro-choice movement. 
Operation Rescue took the conflict 
of the deceptive 
abortion clinics ~o a new level. If th
e protesters had simply 
91 IBID p. 35 
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blocked access to the abortio·n clinics and were then arrested, 
the results may have been quite different. The protestors 
would have .been able to present themselves as "victims of the 
system", who were trying to right a wrong. The mass media 
would have shown quiet, non-resistive protestors being hauled 
off by the police. Instead, the American public saw the 
protesters harassing women who were trying to exercise their 
right to have an abortion~ The pro-life movement, unable to 
ban abortion through regular channels, resorts to 
~ 
confrontation to try and effect a change in the legal status 
of abortion. As a result, the pro-life movement quickly gained 
an image, with some validity, of trying to force a policy 
position on an unwilling majority. 
Ironically, the one area in which the pro-life movement 
has proven to be most successful has been from "working within 
the system". By working to lobby federal and state 
legislators, the pro-life movement has been able to make real 
and significant changes in the status of abortion in parts of 
the country. The best example of this is the Webster law 
passed in Missouri. By·working to support and elect a pro-life 
legislator in the Missouri Legislator, the pro-life movement 
was able to get a law passed that was the basis for Webster . 
The • maJor drawback of legislative lobbying 
• 1S that 
progress was often measured. in terms of years, not weeks and 
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months. Many elements of the pro-life movement were unwilling 
or unable to wait any length of time for laws to resolve the 
immorality that they saw in legalized abortion. (refer to Mr. 
Scheidler's comment in the section on fire bombings) What has 
proven ironic is that the legislative approach achieved more 
in three years than direct action had in 8 years. 
But even in the arena of legislative lobbying, the pro-
life movement has chosen to take a heavy handed approach. Many 
of the bills and amendments that are introduced each year in 
the House and Senate tend to be all or nothing. One example· of 
this would be the Human Rights Amendment. This amendment would 
seek to outlaw abortion and would also outlaw any forms of 
birth control that would prevent a fertilized egg from 
attaching to the uterine wall. The reason for this is that the 
amendment states that life begins at tonception. Under a law 
such as this, the use of birth control pills and RU-48692 
would be banned. A law such as this simply does not reflect 
the desires of most Americans. 
The pro-life movement would have found more favor with 
the American public if it had taken from the beginning a more 
conciliatory approach. There are certain cases, such as rape 
92 RU-486 is the French developed "morning 
~fter" pill, that prevents the fertilized egg from attaching 
to the uterine wall. It's introduction in the United States 
has been held up by the Federal Government, even though it 
has proven very successful in Europe. 
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or incest, that should allow for some form of legalized 
abortion. The pro-life movement may have found more success if 
it had tried to limit abortion in stages, rather than all at 
once. As it happened, the pro-life movement tried to tackle 
abortion head-on, and was not nearly as successful. By their 
self-entrenchment behind dogma, they have made it much harder 
to achieve their goals. 
The underpinning of this failure is that the pro-life 
movement is unwilling to accept abortion as a social evil. Few 
Americans favor a total ban on abortion, just as few Americans 
favor carte blanc abortion. The pro-life movement has made no 
attempts to compromise with the pro-choice movement, but 
rather sought to resoundingly condemn them as baby killers. 
Operation Rescue is still in operation, and there seems to be 
no lessening of resolve. What may finally undo Operation 
Rescue is a lack of funds and increased weariness on the part 
of the American public, who have become tired with the 
combativeness of the debate. 
While all this is going on, the pro~choice movement has 
been active in a more subdued manner. For a large part of the 
struggle, the pro-choice move·ment was sitting on the side 
lines, not taking much action. ·Based in part on a false 
feeling of security stemming from the success of Roe v. Wade, 
the pro-choice movement did not do much. It was only after 
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they were directly threatened 
by pro-life movement gains tha
t 
they took action. Although th
e pro-choice movement march 
in 
April of 1989 did not convince
 Justice O'Conner, it did serv
e 
to focus attention on the pro
-choice movement. 
The pro-choice movement had b
een effective in its work 
within the legal system. By u
tilizing the RICO laws, the pr
o-
choice movement was abie to
 make some gains in terms 
of 
limiting the effectiveness of 
Operation Rescue. The pro-choi
ce 
movement has also utilized t
he legal system as counter 
to 
Operation Rescue. In some 
cities, such as New York a
nd 
Washington, D.C., the pro
-choice movement has secu
red 
pe~manent restraining order
s to keep pro-life moveme
nt 
protesters a certain distance
 from abortion clinics. 
The pro-choice movement has 
not been without its own 
failings. They spent a great
 deal of time on the. side lin
es 
before it became actively invo
lved in th~ abortion debate. T
he 
pro-choice movement, like the
 pro-life movement, is beset 
by 
the problem that it is not on
e movement, but many movement
s. 
Certain elements of the pro-
choice movement have chosen 
to 
push for abortion without lim
itations. They want full feder
al 
funding for abortions and wit
h no restrictions. Their mot
to, 
"abortion on demand withou
t apology" illustrates the
ir 
militancy. In the same way th
at Operation Rescue is seen a
s 
extreme, the position of th
e far wings of the pro-cho
ice 
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movement also fail to find favor with most Americans. Few 
Americans want abortion totally banned, nor do they want 
abortion totally free. At present, the guidelines set out by 
Roe v. Wade serve as the common ground where most Americans 
wish to stand, at least for the time being. 
There is a furth~r question of whether outlawing abortion 
will end it's practice. Given the provisions of the Webster 
ruling, each state is now al lowed to make changes to its 
abortion rules. It is clear, that·while some states will limit 
abortion as much as possible, others will maintain some level 
of liberal abortion laws. In this way, even if abortion is 
illegal in one state, a woman can travel to another to receive 
an abortion. The issue now becomes one of class and economic 
inequity. The limitation on abortion is not only legal, but 
. 
economic. 
In the end, it may not matter if the two sides reach an 
agreement. America, in a sense, has already decided. It does 
not want free and unlimited abortion, and it does not want 
abortion outlawed. It is willing to accept abortion as it is, 
available but restricted. Only four states
93 have made any 
~ Idaho, Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Utah 
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attempts to restrict abortion·. 94 • These four states are a 
clear minority, representing less than 10% of the Union. 
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It would seem that the pro-choice movement forces are 
winning the overall battle to keep abortion legal. For the 
past 15 yea.rs, the pro--life movement has been unable to 
significantly change the attitudes of Americans towards 
abortion. Indeed, they have served to alienate a great many 
people who may have sympathies towards the pro-life movement. 
They have succeeded in launching a major attack in the form of 
Webster, but they have been unable to follow through in other 
states. 
All hope is not lost for the pro-life movement. They have 
made great gains in getting the issue before the American 
people. Behind the scenes, the New Right has been successful 
. .,
in changing the entire composition of the Supreme Court. It 
would appear that in the near future· there will be some 
challenge to Roe v. Wade. What may ultimately happen is that 
abortion may find itself under greater restriction and with 
greater limitations than it enjoys today. 
~. Although there has been a great deal of 
debate in many state houses, few states have been able to 
get legislation out of committee and before the governor. 
95 In terms of population, the four states 
represent 8% of the total U.S. population. 
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The reason why some sort of compromise will be 
needed is 
that the abortion debate has become divisive
 for American 
society. It has become the issue in some politi
cal campaigns. 
This is dangerous because it pushes other iss
ues out of the 
picture. Some of th~se displaced issues are ch
ild care, labor 
and civil rights and taxation. All of these, and
 other issues, 
deserve to be heard by the voters. It is wrong 
and unfair for 
the abortion debate to dominate the entire po
litical process 
and shout down other important issues. In 
his dissenting 
opinion of Webster, Justice Harry Blackmum wro
te: 
To overturn a constitutional decision is a 
rare and grave undertaking. To overtur
n a 
constitutional decision that secured a fundam
ental 
personal liberty to millions of persons woul
d be 
unprecedented in our 2 00 years of Constituti
onal 
history. 
Today's decision involves the most politically 
divisive domestic legal issue or our time.
 By 
refusing to explain or to justify its proposed 
revolutionary revision in the law of abortion,
 and 
by refusing to abide not only by or precedent
 but 
also by our canons for reconsidering t
hose 
precedents, the plura.lity invites charges
 of 
·Cowardice and illegitimacy to our door. I ca
nnot 
say this would not be undeserved. 
For today, at 
stands undisturbed. 
nation still retain 
destinies. But the 
ominous, and a chill 
least, the law of abortion 
For today, the women of this 
the liberty to.control their 
signs are evident -and very 
wind blows. 
I dissent96 
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''Webster v Reproductive Health Services" 
United States Supreme Court Reports: Lawyers' 
Edition The 
Lawyers co-operative Publishing Company, Octob
er Term 1988, 
p. 462-463 
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